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Creating a Regional Security Community in Southern Latin America: The Institutionalisation of the Regional Defence and Security Policies

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N° 13

December 2005



Working Papers Global and Area Studies

Edited by the German Overseas Institute (DÜI) in Hamburg.

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Editor of the Working Paper Series: Bert Hoffmann <hoffmann@iik.duei.de>

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Creating a Regional Security Community in Southern Latin America: The Institutionalisation of the Regional Defence and Security Policies

Abstract

Interdependence, collective identities and common institutions are the preconditions for the evolution of a pluralistic security community. While the interaction of the states of Southern Latin America already meets the first two criteria, this article focuses on the third one, particularly the common institutions of the regional defence and security sector. The bilaterally organised defence cooperation has been attested democratic deficiencies because military actors are over-proportionally represented in these committees. Military nationalism and an exaggerated notion of national sovereignty in the military academies of the region can be regarded as cooperation hampering qualifiers. Non-military threats (organised crime, transnational terrorism) have centripetal effects on the subregional cooperation, which is structured multilaterally and shows a relatively high degree of institutionalisation.

Key words: security community, regional cooperation, defence and security policies, Latin America, Mercosur, Argentina, Brazil, Chile

The paper was presented at the Conference of the World International Studies Committee (WISC) at the Bilgi University in Istanbul, August 24-27, 2005.

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Zusammenfassung

Sicherheitsgemeinschaft Mercosur:

Die Institutionalisierung der regionalen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik

Interdependenz, kollektive Identitäten und gemeinsame Institutionen bilden die Voraussetzungen für die Entstehung einer pluralistischen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft. Die beiden erstgenannten Kriterien werden in dem vorliegenden Artikel für die Interaktionen zwischen den Staaten des südlichen Lateinamerika als gegeben betrachtet. Im Zentrum der Analyse stehen die gemeinsamen Institutionen im regionalen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungssektor. Im Ergebnis werden der bilateral organisierten Verteidigungskooperation erhebliche demokratische Defizite attestiert, da militärische Akteure in den Kooperationsgremien überproportional vertreten sind. Militärischer Nationalismus und die Überbewertung nationaler Souveränität, insbesondere in den Militärakademien der Region, zeitigen eine kooperationshemmende Wirkung. Die nicht militärischen Bedrohungen (organisierte Kriminalität und transnationaler Terrorismus) wirken sich dagegen eher zentripetal auf die regionale Zusammenarbeit aus. Sie haben zur Entstehung multilateraler Mechanismen zu ihrer Eindämmung beigetragen, die einen relativ hohen Institutionalisierungsgrad aufweisen.

Article Outline

1. Introduction
2. Applying Karl W. Deutsch's Qualifiers of Security Communities: Interdependence, Collective Identities and Common Institutions
3. The Institutionalisation of Mercosur's Defence and Security Cooperation
4. Conclusions

1. Introduction

One of the most striking features of the political development of Southern Latin America over the last two decades is the close connection between democratisation, regional integration and security policy¹ (see Hirst 1998, Rojas Aravena 1996). It is becoming increasingly obvious that geopolitical considerations and traditional threat scenarios between the states are of less importance. First steps of a security political agreement have been introduced such as arms control agreements, publication of military white books, mutual transparency of the defence budgets. The more resistant against regression these cooperative processes are, the more the assumption by Hurrell (see 1998) is confirmed that a regional security community in Southern Latin America exists between Argentina and Brazil or that it is

¹ In the following the area of security policy includes all institutional and procedural aspects of political actions, which lead to the protection of the population against external dangers. This includes a) potential transnational, non-military threats in Southern Latin America (drug and arms trafficking, money laundering as forms of organised crime, transnational activities of guerrilla organisations, international terrorism, proliferation of means of mass destruction); b) defence policies including the protection of the territorial integrity of a state against external attacks carried out by force of arms; and c) all areas of foreign policies which aim at bilateral, subregional, continental or global cooperation in security matters, conflict resolution and the prevention of organised violent acts.

about to develop (critically of this Schmitter 1991, Hirst 1998). This paper will analyse the evolution of the potential pluralistic security community in Southern Latin America by modifying the qualifiers of Karl W. Deutsch (1957), whilst focusing on the institutionalisation of the intraregional defence and security policy cooperation.

Achieving common rules on the regional level between smaller groups of nations is more likely than the unanimous and consensual acceptance of security policy rules within the world wide context, since these smaller groups have probably got partially parallel normative patterns from the beginning. Accordingly this applies even more to subregions such as Southern Latin America. After all the states of the subregion look back on a wide range of common historic experiences: The rule of colonial powers until the 19th century, the military dictatorships till the end of the 20th century and the following processes of democratisation. Additionally the states of the South of Latin America share a similar cultural background originating in their "Iberian roots" with Christian-catholic values. Collective historic and cultural experiences support the reciprocal understanding and the peaceful coordination of national interests.

Academics and politicians regard the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) initiated by the Asunción treaty of 1991 consensually as the most successful integration project outside the OECD-area so far. It is true that the economic interlocking between the full members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay as well as the associated member states Chile, Bolivia and Peru does not exclude political and economic divergences of interest. However, it limits the risk of security political tensions, since economic elites in the concerned countries and transnational companies would consider them to be a cost factor and a locational disadvantage. The close foreign political coordination – as shown by the harmonisation of the foreign trade policies between the Mercosur states – is diametrically opposed to the traditional threat scenarios between the states.

Consequently politico-geographical considerations and traditional threatening scenarios between the countries in the South of Latin America are losing importance increasingly. First steps of a security political agreement have been introduced instead. They include the solution of the notorious borderline conflicts and the ratification of control agreements on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the 1990s. A binational border commission had been instructed to write a report on the remaining territorial questions. The 25 territorial divergences between Argentina and Chile existent until the change of the Chilean government could almost be completely solved in agreement by this conflict solving mechanism. The last controversial territorial question in the South of Latin America concerning the so-called *hielos continentales* has been settled by Argentina and Chile in 1999.

By the agreement from Mendoza between Argentina, Brazil and Chile in 1991 the dissemination, the possession and the use of biological and chemical weapons were prohibited. In the same year Argentina, Brazil and the international IAEA of the UN entered into a trilateral agreement, from which the *Agência Brasileiro Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares* (ABACC) based in Rio de Janeiro developed. By this agreement the signatory states committed themselves to an exclusively peaceful usage of their nuclear facilities. In doing so they put the treaty from Tlatelolco in force, which was already signed in 1968 for the building of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. In 1996 Brazil joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) already signed in 1968 between the nuclear powers. In this treaty Argentina and Chile had already committed themselves in 1994 respectively in 1995 not to strive for the possession of nuclear weapons. By signing the declaration from Potrero de los Funes in 1996 the Presidents of the Mercosur countries created a multilateral consultation and concertation mechanism concerning questions of international politics (*Foro de Consulta y Concertación Política*/Forum for Political Consultation and Concertation – FCCP). In 1999 the member states of the Mercosur including Bolivia and Chile reminded of the political dimension of the integration alliance by the declaration from Ushuaia declaring the subregion a peace zone (*Zona de Paz*).

It is true that the international treaties mean considerable achievements in the field of the cooperative security, but they aim more at the enclosure of potential conflicts than the development of collective security structures: The reduction of tensions and the reduced reciprocal perception of threat resulting from confidence building measures and regimes for arms control prevent the repeated development of mutual distrust and the revival of an power balance discourse (Hurrell 1998: 540). It must be taken into account that the relations between the neighbouring countries Brazil and Argentina as well as between Chile and Argentina has mainly been marked by hostilities for almost two centuries. The respective neighbouring state held the primary potential of danger in the conflict hypotheses of these countries. The friendly relations between the countries in the South of Latin America, which could only develop after a protracted removal of the threatening scenarios and the military doctrines derived from them, have only existed since the beginning of the 1990s (see Flemes 2003a).

In spite of the rapprochement between the Mercosur countries no security political regime or another subregional security system has derived from the intraregional cooperation so far. Neither have the actors involved decided that the objective of the ongoing process should be the formalization or institutionalisation of the security and defence policy collaboration. On the contrary this is about a widely open process, the result of which can hardly be forecasted by politicians and scientists. Therefore the first step has got to be the tracing of

the actual development of the international cooperation over the past years in order to determine their degree of formalization and effect with respect to specific measures and cooperation forums. Only on this empirical foundation a hypothesis on the development of a pluralistic security community with the core countries Brazil, Argentina and Chile can be verified or disproved. But before examining the bi- and multilateral cooperation mechanisms of the subregion in detail, a spotlight on the theoretical concept of security communities shall demonstrate how it can help explaining the security and defence policy cooperation process in Southern Latin America.

2. Applying Karl W. Deutsch's Qualifiers of Security Communities: Interdependence, Collective Identities and Common Institutions

According to Karl W. Deutsch (1961: 98) a security community is identified by the following features:

“[...] a security community [...] is a group that has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with reasonable certainty over a long period of time.”

Thus besides the security policy cooperation Deutsch (1957) had defined stable relations between the social environments of the states as characteristic of a security community. Deutsch considered the following components to be essential to a security community: (1) mutual interdependence within the intraregional relations, (2) a high degree of collective identity and common values as well as (3) a tight network of common institutions and standards, which regulates the relations and contribute to the peaceful conflict resolution. By the security and defence political processes of institutionalisation between Brazil and its partner states the presented study throws particularly light on the third component suggested by Deutsch. In the following it will be empirically justified, why it is assumed in this study that the intraregional relations in Southern Latin America already meet the first two conditions for the existence of a security community for the most part.

(1) The mutual interdependence of the societies that proves to be particularly well developed in the sector of subregional economic relations in the context of the Mercosur is without doubt an important basis for the security political rapprochement between the states of Southern Latin America. Aggregated data on trade, direct investments and capital flows underline the relatively high – with respect to a developing region – degree of economic integration of the subregion (see IMF 2001a, 2001b, IDB 2002a, 2002b, Lacarte/Granados 2004

as well as Mühlich 2004). Today the Mercosur is rated as the world's third biggest trade block after the EU and the NAFTA (Gratius 2001: 42). 70% of Latin American foreign trade and the direct investments (Nunnenkamp 2003: 30f.) is transacted by the Mercosur. The member states' volumes of trade show their relative economic interdependence on the one side and point out the asymmetries between the Mercosur-partners on the other side.² By way of conclusion it can be said that the share of the intraregional trade in the entire foreign trade of the Mercosur has doubled between 1990 and 2000 and thus amounted already to more than 20% in the year 2000 (IDB 2002a: 26). By the end of 2004 the intraregional trade between the Mercosur states formed already a quarter of their entire foreign trade (Lacarte/Granados 2004: 57), illustrating the upward tendency.

Another aspect of the progressive economic interdependence implies the intraregional direct investments.³ Yoguel (see 1996) observes the development of transnational networks of enterprises in the Mercosur. Especially between Argentine and Brazilian smaller and medium sized enterprises in the sector of sugar production, in the petrochemical and the dairy industry. While the development of regional networks between companies seems to be progressing slowly, greater dynamics can be observed on the level of the business unions and chambers of commerce (Pohl 2003: 94f.).⁴ Already in 1986 the central trade unions of Southern Latin America founded the *Coordinadora de Centrales Sindicales del Cono Sur* (CCSCS) as a regional forum for discussion and cooperation.⁵

(2) Especially the forms of the transnational cooperation in the subregional economic sector do not only represent the growing interdependence between the Mercosur states, but they also imply that the market economy is one of several common value systems of the societies of the Mercosur. According to Karl W. Deutsch (see 1957) mutual interdependence and

² Paraguay, for example, transacts 70% of its foreign trade with the Mercosur states and Uruguay 45%. In 2003 Argentina exported 34% of its total exports to the member states of the Mercosur after all. In contrast to this Brazil is far less dependent on its integration partners concerning trade, since merely 19% of its total exports were delivered to the Mercosur-area in 2003 (see Lacarte/Granados 2004).

³ More than 350 Brazilian enterprises are active in Argentina and more than 150 Argentine companies are active in Brazil (Eßer 2000: 4). Eßer regards these enterprises as motors of the economic integration in the Mercosur. According to Sangmeister (2001: 15) the considerable progresses on the micro level of the economic integration lead to an increasing institutionalisation of a Mercosur's own entrepreneurship.

⁴ In 1991, for example, the national unions of the industrial companies in the Mercosur founded the *Consejo Industrial del Mercosur* (CIM). Even various national industry associations (i.e. petrochemicals and automobile industry) collaborate more intensely and represent their interests commonly at international forums (Hasenclever et al. 1999: 417, Casaburi et al. 1998: 15f.).

⁵ Since the beginning of the 1990s the topics of the integration process have been gaining importance within the CCSCS. In June 1997 the trade unions of the Mercosur states organised the trade union- and social summit meeting of the Mercosur in Asuncion (Garnelo 1998: 51). Since then the Presidents of the national trade unions are meeting for regular conferences.

common institutions build necessary conditions for the development of a regional security community in the same way as collective values and standards. So the comprehensive approach by Deutsch relates to the formation of relations between states and their societies that are based on a “sense of community”, which is characterized among others by a high degree of collective identity and common values. Apart from the market economy particularly democracy and human rights are the values that associate the Mercosur states. Furthermore the “we-feeling” of the states of Southern Latin America is encouraged by common social problems (poverty and high income concentration) within the states and a common preference of multilateral solutions as well as a high esteem for the international law within the international relations.

According to opinion surveys today the citizens of Southern Latin America have mostly got a positive image of each other.⁶ The community feeling in the Mercosur states is underlined by congress surveys, for example, according to which two thirds of the interviewed Congressmen of the Mercosur states support the subregional plans of integration by their governments (Alcántara Sáez 2000: 9). By a survey of the Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI) the majority of the interviewed persons – amongst them Argentine opinion leaders from society, politics, sciences and economy – regarded the subregional integration as most important foreign political objective out of a selection of twelve (CARI 2002: 19).⁷

(3) The development of institutions is attached with great importance in the formation of a regional security community. In contrast to the first mentioned criteria the process of institutionalisation between the states of Southern Latin America – especially in the sector of security- and defence policy – is not obvious, but has to be shown in the course of this article. The regional institutions must be strong enough in order to generate “mutually reliable expectations of peaceful change” (Deutsch 1957: 5). Force is ruled out as a means of conflict resolution. Stable and institutionalised cooperative relations between the political systems build the infrastructure for the overcoming of the security dilemma within the security community.

The lacking institutionalisation of the cooperation between the states of Southern Latin America seems to counter the development of a subregional security community at first

⁶ By a survey carried out in the Mercosur states in 2004 by the Brazilian Institute for Opinion Research (IBOPE) 65% of the interviewed Brazilians rated their Argentine neighbours as altogether positive. Even higher was the Brazilian approval of the Chileans (72%). In 2004 76% of the Argentines and 69% of the Chileans had a positive image of Brazil (see IBOPE 2004).

⁷ Inquiring about the meaning of the South American states for the regional security policy the Argentines assign the leading role in South America to the ABC-states. At the same time the greatest influence is awarded to Brazil, followed by Chile and Argentina (CARI 2002: 34).

sight. It is true that still a relatively small degree of economic and commercial political institutionalisation is ascribed to the Mercosur after the Mercosur Council and the Group of the Mercosur have been supplemented by a Technical Secretariat in Montevideo, a Revision Court in Asuncion as well as a Committee of Permanent Representatives (even a Mercosur Parliament is planned for the future). However the security political cooperation and its institutionalisation within the Mercosur is continuously underestimated in the hardly existent specific literature.

3. The Institutionalisation of Mercosur's Defence and Security Cooperation

Ultimately a rising degree of cooperation can only be measured by the increase in the bilateral and multilateral channels between the countries. This fact is taken into account in this article, which summarizes the bi- and multilateral cooperation forums of the subregion. At the same time the degree to which the analysed cooperation mechanisms are formalized and institutionalised is of crucial importance. Their multilateral character distinguishes the security political collaboration forums that are supported by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Home Offices, the Ministries of Justice and the Ministries of Finance of the subregion. Their multilateral structure allows the institutional integration of some of the security political cooperation mechanisms into the political Mercosur.

The military and defence political collaboration, which applies mainly to the bilateral level and which the Ministries of Defence and the Armed Forces are in charge of in the first place, differs from it. In this context the question arises, if the present UN peace mission in Haiti can bring about a "multilateral turn" within the subregional defence political collaboration. After all there are also Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and Paraguayan as well as Uruguayan units involved in the peace mission among other South American army corps. An army general of the regional power Brazil is in command of the Haiti-mission (MINUSTAH). In the following the bilaterally organised defence political cooperation will be analysed focussing the regional power Brazil. Because as the politically and militarily most important player the Amazon state is cooperating with nearly all South American states in defence politics.

3.1. Brazil's Defence Policy Cooperation between Dominant Armed Services and Marked Bilateralism

During the 1980s the military cooperation in the continental context between Brazil and its neighbouring countries were still predominantly organized under the aegis of the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB or *Junta Interamericana de Defensa* – JID) based in Washing-

ton. Since the 1960s the Pentagon has invited the commanders in chief of the American armed services to regular meetings (such as the *Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos – CEA*) in order to talk about the regional security situation and coordinate the activities of the military intelligences (Radseck 1998: 8). The first supranational manoeuvres of the region have also taken place in the context of the Inter-American meetings of the three branches of service: Naval exercises have been carried out bi-annually in the South Atlantic, in which Uruguay and the USA participated besides the ABC-countries. Until the end of the 1980s merely the Navy managed to realise a subregional military cooperation excluding the USA and applying to the technical sector only. So the *Control Area Marítima Atlántico Sur*-agreement (COAMAS) between the Mercosur countries agreed on the restricted exchange of information between the naval units and the coordination of patrols in the South Atlantic.

Since 1993 representatives of the Joint General Staffs of all Southern Latin American armed forces have been taking part in annual symposiums on strategic studies. The subject of the military cooperation on the subregional level represents the thread running through these conferences through the 1990s. Only at the X. *Simposio de Estudios Estratégicos de los Estados Mayores Conjuntos y de la Defensa* in 1997 in Montevideo, for instance, more than half of the contributions dealt with the theme “The Mercosur and the subregional security – Effects on the role of the Armed Forces”. Accordingly Radseck (1998: 9-13) observes an increase in the actors involved in the military cooperation from the 1990s, which meant a qualitative leap of the defence political collaboration in this case: Besides the armed services the joint general staffs and especially the civilianly run ministries of defence (in Brazil a ministry of that kind was only established in 1999) are called for action. The following paragraphs will show in what way this tendency can be traced by recent history.

The military cross-border cooperation during the 1990s, which went far beyond the common degree of confidence building measures between the armed forces, is indication for the development of a security community in the South of Latin America. The cooperation, for example, included the exchange of officers between the national military institutions and mutual technological support as well as common military exercises, which were carried out on a bilateral and subregional level (see Flemes 2004b).

However, a starting institutionalisation of the military- and defence political cooperation can only be observed on a bilateral level. Since 2000 Brazil has been holding bilateral working groups for defence policy (*Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa – GTBD*) with several countries of the subregion. Since 1995 the half-yearly sitting *Comité Permanente de Seguridad* (COMPERSEG) has been ensuring a continuous security political dialogue between Argentina and Chile, in which representatives of the joint general staffs and civil actors from the ministries of foreign affairs and the ministries of defence cooperate. This committee paved

the way for a standardized methodology for the equalization of the defence budgets of the two countries supervised by the ECLAC. Since 1997 the *Mecanismo de Consulta y Coordinación entre Brasil y Argentina en materia de Defensa y Seguridad Internacional* (Brazilian-Argentine Consultation and Coordination Mechanism for International Security and Defence Issues – MCC) also sits in conference. The MCC is an Argentine-Brazilian security political coordination forum similar to the COMPERSEG where the participating ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of defence emphasize the necessity of the foundation of a security alliance in the context of the Mercosur.

The different kinds of international cooperation between civilian and military actors imply that Argentina, Brazil and Chile do no longer perceive each other as a threat, but strive for a common protection against external dangers. These countries do not consider military violence as a means of solving conflicts any more:

“On the military as well as the diplomatic level all actors involved are aware that dispute with the neighbouring countries can impossibly be settled by military force [...] military actors only talk of cooperation, not of integration on the defence sector” (Rial 1994: 38).

The more the observed cooperation processes turn out to be resistant to regression, the more indication there is for the assumption that a regional security community is about to develop in the South of Latin America with the core countries Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

In the following the single forums of the defence political cooperation with Brazilian participation are analysed. It will be looked at the two military and defence political cooperation mechanisms introduced earlier at first. These cooperation forums that are chiefly coordinated by the Ministries of Defence – including technical collaboration and personnel exchange between the armed services – are mainly of a bilateral nature.

The Consultation Mechanism for International Security and Defence Issues (MCC)⁸

In April 1997 Buenos Aires and Brasilia agreed to a future security political collaboration by a common memorandum (*Memorandum de Entendimiento sobre Consulta y Coordinación*). The Brazilian-Argentine Consultation and Coordination Mechanism for International Security and Defence Issues (MCC) was established in August 1997 with the Protocol from Itaipava

⁸ The majority of the information presented on the *Mecanismo de Consulta y Coordinación entre Brasil y Argentina en materia de Defensa y Seguridad Internacional* is in the Argentine as well as in the Brazilian Ministry of Defence rated confidential and thus not accessible to the public. The following paragraphs are chiefly based on research interviews by the author with members of the Armed Forces, Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and academic defence experts in November/December 2003 and in May/June 2004 in Brazil (see the list of interview partners), whom I would like to thank for their support at this point.

(*Acta de Itaipava*). The representatives of government agreed on annual meetings, which were to take place alternately in Argentina and Brazil. It was decided on the building of an executive secretary's office, the *Mecanismo de Análisis Estratégico* (MAE).

From the beginning the absence of a civilian ministry of defence in Brazil has contributed to an asymmetry within the bilateral relations, which is rather unusual for the actors involved. The ministry founded in 1999 has only got involved in the work of the bilateral groups more intensely over the last two years, especially in the operating level (MAE). With the starting consolidation of the structures of the still quite young ministry and the inherent capability to coordinate a greater regularity of the MAE-meetings can be noticed as well as a more explicit subject agenda since 2002. However, up until now the Argentine actors show greater initiative. They can refer to experiences already made at the bilateral defence cooperation with Chile (COMPERSEG) and are obviously more interested in the bilateral cooperation forum. Three of the so far four meetings of the MAE were organized by the Argentine government and took place in Buenos Aires.

By this two aspects are addressed, which might complicate a further development and intensification of the MCC: Asymmetries and diverging interests between the two countries and internal factors, such as different patterns of civil-military relations, which the late foundation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defence already points at. Another problem implies the lack of transparency of the investigated defence political committees. This problem could be solved by coupling to the academic community, which is equipped with a greater public reach.

Divergent security political interests do not only result from the different military, political and economic potential of the two South American countries, but especially from the different claims and aspirations. While the Argentines are increasingly keen on the subregional cooperation and mainly critical to a "special partnership" with the USA, as it had still been intended by Carlos Menem, the regional power Brazil is trying to diversify its international relations. Brazil's turning to other regional powers (Russia, India, China, South Africa), which also implies security political components, is critically observed by the Argentine conservative side (see *La Nación*, 18 March, 2004). Argentina reproaches Brasilia for ultimately pursuing global objectives and using the Mercosur merely as a medium to position herself as a *global player*. These voices are confirmed by Brazil's sole claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations, should it be reformed.

However, the moderate Brazilian engagement respectively the sluggish consolidation of the bilateral committees in the defence sector cannot only be explained by diverging roles within the international system. Comparative analyses come to the result that the civil supremacy in the Argentine case has developed the most since the country's economic decline

under the military government, the lost Falkland-Conflict and the following discreditation of the Argentine Armed Forces (see Diamint 1999, Diamond/Plattner 1998, Heinz 2001, Hunter 1998, Pion-Berlin 2001). Nevertheless the Argentine Armed Forces do also have influence on the military and defence policy. Therefore the Argentine Ministry of Defence has hardly influence on structural changes within the military institutions. This is due to quickly fluctuating staff combined with a chaos concerning competences. In the international collaboration the Argentine armed services pursue the interests of their institutions to an accordingly great extent, since the Ministry of Defence expresses hardly any political targets that could focus the objectives of the armed services within the bi- or multilateral military cooperation. As far as that goes the Argentine Ministry of Defence is able to make the Army, Air Force and Navy proposals at the most, but not to exercise the command authority. Apart from the civil control deficit the Argentine Ministry of Defence is certified considerable functional deficits at the implementation of defence political defaults that would have to precede the goal-directed intensification of the defence political cooperation (Radseck 2004a: 129).

Previous analyses has already detected functional deficits of a similar kind in the Brazilian Ministry of Defence at the definition and implementation of the security and defence policies as well as a weak civil control over the Armed Forces. Up until today the defence policy has to be regarded as a military enclave in the Brazilian case (Flemes 2004a). Although the Brazilian political elites clearly state their willingness to intensify bilateral cooperation mechanisms with Argentina, such as the MCC and MAE, these efforts regularly peter out on the declarative level. One reason for that is the fact that numerous decisive positions in the Brazilian Ministry of Defence are held by conservative generals who fear a loss of their influence on the security and defence policy, should future decisions on the bilateral or subregional level be made by political actors.

As long as information and channels of communication of the bilateral military collaboration are almost exclusively controlled and kept secret by the military in the Brazilian Ministry of Defence, the generals continue to be in charge of the control monopoly within the bilateral defence political collaboration. The breaking up of this monopoly of the generals and the integration of civil actors (Parliament, media, sciences) in the discussion and decision making processes is only possible, if the culture of secrecy is clearly restricted in the Brazilian sector of security and defence.

The Bilateral Working Groups for Defence Policy

Since its foundation the civilianly run Brazilian Ministry of Defence has initiated bilateral working groups for defence policy (*Grupos de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa – GTBD*) with most South American countries. Those working groups that function as intergovernmental dis-

cussion forums for defence political issues exist between Brazil and all the countries of the extended Mercosur – only Paraguay is excluded so far. Moreover Brazil has also been keeping up bilateral working groups for defence policy with Peru and Venezuela since 2001. The GTBD between the Brazilian and Argentine Ministry of Defence was founded in July 2000 in Brasilia. On this occasion the two Ministers of Defence decided annual meetings – alternately in Argentina and Brazil –, which should contribute to a more efficient bilateral cooperation on the defence sector. So far three meetings of the Argentine-Brazilian working group have taken place. The respective home government has delivered meeting-records.⁹

The first conference of the Argentine-Brazilian cooperation forum for questions of defence took place on 26 October 2001 in Brasilia. Both delegations were headed by the Ministers of Defence (Geraldo Quintão, Brazil and José Horacio Jaunarena, Argentina). Apart from five officers there was only one diplomat – the Minister's consultant Machado e Costa – in the Brazilian delegation. The delegation of the Argentine Minister of Defence reflected a more balanced image with four civilians and five members of the military. The officers involved were employed at various departments of the administrations – mainly in the Ministries of Defence – and did therefore not take part in the bilateral working groups as representatives of the Armed Forces. The following three subject areas reflect the agenda of the working group up to now:

- Defence policy cooperation:

All bilateral agreements and memoranda, all commonly performed manoeuvres, military exchange programs and defence policy meetings between Argentina and Brazil are coordinated by the GTBD.

- Agreement on the Control of Non-Identified Air Crafts:

By a bilateral agreement on the common control of the air space above the Argentine-Brazilian state border the illegal air traffic between the two countries should be made more difficult, which is chiefly aimed at the drug and arms smuggling. The bilateral treaty mainly implies the improvement of the communication and coordination between the Argentine and Brazilian Air Force concerning the control of the common air space.

- Establishment of a regional strategic centre for training and studies:

The establishment of a regional strategic study centre is about an Argentine initiative, which the Brazilian actors did not particularly appreciate. The Brazilian side

⁹ The author has only got access to the meeting-record of the first meeting of the Argentine-Brazilian *Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa* from 26 October 2001 in Brasilia. The following paragraph is mainly based on the meeting-record, which the Brazilian Ministry of Defence has kindly made available.

pointed to the Centre for Strategic Studies (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos) within the *Escola Superior de Guerra*, which is subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, and plans for an institute for defence policy within the Ministry of Defence in Brasilia. Thus the first priority should be to interlock already existing think tanks in the ministries of defence electronically in order to guarantee a permanent exchange of information.

The Bilateral Working Group for Defence Policy between Brazil and Chile has already had the first meeting in December 2000 in Santiago de Chile. Both countries' Ministers of Defence – Geraldo Quintão, Brazil and Mario Fernández, Chile – made the coordination of both countries' defence political positions the main objective of the bilateral cooperation forum, which is meant to be realized by annual meetings¹⁰. While the Chilean delegation consisted of five civilians and nine members of the military, there was again only one civilian representative amongst the Brazilian delegation of eight persons in total. Annual meetings of Brazil's and Chile's Joint General Staffs were planned for the future. In addition to that the Brazilian delegation suggested the establishment of sub-working groups, which should deal with issues of bilateral interest: Military cooperation, planning and organization, strategic intelligence as well as science, technology and arms industry. The results of the sub-working groups are to be presented at the annual meetings of the GTBD.

The UN Peace Mission in Haiti: Heading towards a Multilateral Security and Defence Policy under Brazilian Leadership?

The mission in Haiti might also have implications for the future defence political cooperation between the South American countries. On the basis of the UN Resolution 1542 the Stabilization Mission MINUSTAH has been installed in Haiti in June 2004. A Brazilian Army General is in command of the peace operation. The multilateral peacekeeping force headed by Brazil consists of 6,700 soldiers from 13 countries all together. Brazil deploys the biggest troop with 1,200 men, who are meant to protect the inhabitants' security in Port au Prince. Chile provides a contingent of 600 soldiers who are responsible for the security in the Northern part of the country around Haiti's second largest city Cap-Haitien. Argentina provides a battalion of 600 soldiers for the control of the former stronghold of rebels Gonaives. Uruguay's battalion (also 600 soldiers) patrols in the Southern part of Haiti. Paraguayan, Bolivian and Peruvian units complete the South American contingent. Apart from Canada,

¹⁰ The author has only got access to the meeting-records of the first two meetings of the Brazilian-Chilean *Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa* from 14 December 2000 in Santiago de Chile and from 13 November 2001 in Brasilia.

France and the USA – all of them had supported the previous interim mission (MIF) – Benin, Nepal and Croatia sent smaller units and single specialists to Haiti.

The special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations supervises the UN mission in Haiti. The former Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs Juan Gabriel Valdés is entrusted with this task. The stabilization of the security situation in the Caribbean state is the ultimate aim of the MINUSTAH in order to guarantee the realization of the presidential races planned for the end of 2005. In addition to the maintenance of law and democratic order the disarmament of the around 25,000 rebels is the most difficult problem the blue berets are confronted with. In spring 2004 these rebels marched towards Port au Prince and finally forced the deposition of the authoritarian President Aristide who is said to have entered office by electoral fraud.

Even if the disarmament of the civilians will only be little successful in the short-term, MINUSTAH is of great importance for the defence political cooperation in South America. Above all it has to be noticed that for the first time peacekeeping forces that consist almost exclusively of South American units carry out a peace mission of the United Nations headed by Brazil. The practical military cooperation between the South American governments has got the potential of introducing a turn to multilateralism within the subregional defence cooperation, which has so far mainly relied on bilateral structures. Even President da Silva and his then Minister of Defence Viegas have stressed this progress at a visit to the troops prior to the football match on 18 May 2004 in Port au Prince (see Estado de São Paulo, 19 May, 2004).

The Argentine President Nestor Kirchner went one step further. He understands the participation of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the Haiti-mission as a permanent multilateral task force about to develop. The military units of the ABC-countries should first of all be available for UN mandated peace missions and build “the embryo of a common regional defence system” (see Estado de São Paulo, 18 May, 2004). The Argentine Minister of Defence Pampuro added that this was not yet about a military arm of the Mercosur, but the development headed towards defence political integration. At an informal meeting in Buenos Aires in May 2004 the Ministers of Defence of Argentina, Brazil and Chile had analysed the conditions for the establishment of a permanent common troop contingent (ibid.). At a public symposium about security cooperation organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Brasilia in June 2004 the then Chilean Minister of Defence Michelle Bachelet held the view that the cooperation structures between Argentina, Brazil and Chile should be designed in a flexible and multidimensional way for the time being. In fact Bachelet’s intended “flexible security architecture” implies that each of the three countries decides unilaterally, whether to cooperate in the bilateral, subregional or hemispheric context or to pursue several of these

options of the security and defence policy cooperation simultaneously. By this external actors would have the opportunity – by bilateral agreements with single South American countries – to cause discords between them and to disturb the subregional cooperation process severely. This danger was very apparent at Argentina's appointment as the special partner of the NATO in 1997.

A critical view shows differences between the attitudes of the Southern states of Latin America concerning the future structure of the security and defence policy cooperation. Since the voting out of Carlos Menem especially Argentina has been in favour of the development of a subregional security system beyond diplomatic declarations of intent. At the same time Chile represents an intercessor who first of all – due to its classic sovereignty understanding – intends to build a solid frame work of bilateral security cooperation. Uruguay retreats from Brazil consciously at the peace mission in Haiti. The Uruguayan Minister of Defence Fau got a separate participation (*força independente*) of the Uruguayan contingent in the MINUSTAH accepted by the UNO (see *Correio Braziliense*, 14 May, 2004). Headed by the big neighbour the small Mercosur member is obviously worried about its national profile. At the same time Brazil's efforts are restrained, since the Amazon region, which is considered to be strategically vulnerable, is the first priority of Brasilia and a subregional security community with the Cono-Sur-countries would only imply a marginal increase of security in this respect.

3.2. The Multilateral Containment of Transnational Threats in Mercosur

The Mercosur states are confronted with a number of transnational threats. The protagonists of these dangers are no longer the states, but guerrillas, paramilitaries, the organized crime (especially drug and arms dealers) as well as international terrorists who possibly organize themselves within so called lawless areas. The containment of these new security risks – before developing into extensive military conflicts threatening the peace and prosperity of the region – is in the common interest of the states of a potential security community. To generate stability and progress in the South of Latin America in the future and to support the economic process of integration the security political cooperation between the countries of the South of Latin America will play an equally important role as the consolidation of democracy and the respect for the human rights do.

The countries of the Mercosur show different degrees of political stability and varying institutional deficiencies. Only over the past years the national security policies have developed into public policies controlled by democratically legitimated actors. The states in the South of Latin America do not have a tradition of public debates on security political issues, since the Armed Forces have exclusively dominated this field of politics in the past. That is pre-

cisely why the political institutions of the Mercosur countries are obliged to respond to new security risks and thus prevent that the Armed Forces respectively their intelligence services occupy this field of politics recently. Even more heavily weighs the argument that neither the transnationally organized crime nor the international terrorism can be contained by military means only.

The integration of a multitude of government actors into the foreign and security policy of the Mercosur countries implies a tendency resulting from the increasing virulence of transnational threats. Whereas the external agitation of the countries has so far been left to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Offices, today even the Home Offices, the Ministries of Justice, -Finance, -Economic Affairs and -Defence as well as police authorities regard themselves to be integrated into the international cooperation. The priority in containing transnational security risks should be the institutionalised cooperation between these actors who are democratically legitimated by their societies. In order to guarantee an efficient cross-border collaboration the adjustment of the national legal systems is necessary in a second step. In doing so it has to be taken into account that the rule of law and particularly the Mercosur citizens' individual rights are not harmed.

Since the mid-1990s a cooperative process of the containment of non-conventional security risks can be observed within the Mercosur, which has proven to be increasingly consistent in the recent times. To document the state of the subregional security political collaboration first of all the most significant security political cooperation forums already existing are introduced by the FCCP and the Conference of the Home Secretaries. The degree of institutionalisation of these multilateral institutions is of vital importance for the definition of a security community. The General Plan for Regional Security, the data bank for information relevant to the security (SISME), the subregional cooperation of the police institutions as well as the Mercosur Centre for Police Training are results of the work of the Conference of the Home Secretaries.

The starting point for this cooperative process implies the establishment of a trilateral command of the Federal Police at the border triangle between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay in May 1996. Even in the same year the Conference of the Home Secretaries was established. The Conference of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur has been able to achieve a great number of security politically significant agreements since then. Amongst them are, for example, the following agreements signed at the end of the 1990s: Agreement on Security Political Exchange of Information; Agreement on Security at the Border Triangle; as well as the Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Support in the Field of Regional Security.

The Foreign Policy Coordination in the Mercosur

A basic requirement for the work of the mentioned committees is the coordination of the foreign policies of the member states of the Mercosur. It is true that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs are together with the Ministers for Economic Affairs at the head of the Mercosur Council (CMC). However, there is a broad range of duties of the highest ranking Mercosur body, namely the realization of the objectives defined in the treaty from Asuncion and finally the establishment of a common market. Therefore the foundation of a foreign political consultation body of its own was necessary. As early as in 1996 the Presidents of the Mercosur countries had expressed their political willingness to create a special Minister of Foreign Affairs forum by the signing of the Declaration from Potrero de los Funes. Consequently two years later the multilateral FCCP was founded.

This auxiliary body of the Mercosur Council is usually casted with high-ranking employees of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the member states. If the "nature and reach of the subjects dealt with requires it", the Consultation Forum may also have a meeting on the level of the Presidents. The priority of the FCCP is the "expansion and systematisation of the political cooperation" between the member states. As a result the FCCP is planned to represent a common position of the member-countries opposite "third states, groups of states or other international institutions".

It is not presumptuous to identify the FCCP as the embryo of a common foreign and security policy of the Mercosur countries, which is still a long way to go. Since the Mercosur Council has assigned the responsibility for the Minister Conferences without direct economic and commercial political relevance to the FCCP in 2002 at the latest, the crucial channels of communication for the coordination of the foreign and security policies of the member states gather in this forum. Thus the CMC-decision 2/02 instructs the FCCP amongst other things to "accompany and coordinate" the work of the Conferences of the Home Secretaries as well as the working groups against terrorism, illegal arms trade and drug trafficking.

Apart from this the FCCP has to be concerned with the establishment of the Mercosur as an engaged and responsible actor of the international system. This can be achieved by articulating previously and commonly agreed on positions concerning question on the regional and international policy. So the representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Mercosur worked together within the FCCP in the run-up to the meetings of the Rio-group, the Summits of the Americas, the Ibero-American Summits and other international conventions, especially in the context of the Organization of American States. The coordination of biregional agreements of the Mercosur – for example with the Andes Community and the European Union – is another competence of the Political Concertation- and Consultation Forum as well as treaties relating to international law between the Mercosur and single states.

Furthermore the member states of the Mercosur coordinate their voting behaviour in the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations within the FCCP. Special importance was attached to this fact before the second Iraq-intervention led by the USA in 2003. The Mercosur states represented at the UN Security Council at the time, Brazil and Chile, strengthened themselves in their disapproving attitude in the FCCP and voted together – despite considerable pressure from Washington – against a military intervention in the authoritarian state. The agreement between Argentina and Brazil on exclusively giving common votes in the UN Security Council until 2006 (see *El País*, December 19, 2003) was also taken in the FCCP. A working group employed by the FCCP formed a cooperation mechanism for consular questions. As a result common diplomatic representations of the Mercosur countries in third countries may be established since August 2000. Argentina and Brazil are residing in Boston and Hamburg in common consulates, for instance.

The Conference of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur

The Conferences of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur states originate from the Agreement of Fortaleza from 17 December 1996, in which the signatory countries state their willingness to cooperate in questions of transnational security. For this purpose semi-annual meetings are being held since 1997, which take usually place in the Mercosur country holding the rotational presidency. The agreements met at the Conference of the Home Secretaries are documented in the protocols¹¹ and transferred to the Council of the Mercosur, which acknowledges them and integrates them as council decisions into the legal system of the Mercosur.

Four cooperation mechanisms are of great importance for the future subregional security collaboration and shall be briefly introduced. These cooperation mechanisms have derived from the Conferences of the Home Secretaries over the last years and represent a qualitative further development of the security cooperation in the Mercosur: The General Plan for Regional Security, the Mercosur Centre for Police Training set up at the Conference of the Home Secretaries in Rio de Janeiro in 2000, the operative police cooperation decided in Asuncion in 2001 as well as the security data bank SISME implemented in Montevideo in 2003. In the following the basic principles of the practical subregional security political cooperation will be spell out and critically appreciated. Since most of the analysed forms of collaboration are still in their initial stages, an estimation of their respective effectiveness/deficiencies is hardly possible at this moment.

¹¹ The following paragraph is mainly based on the protocols of the Conference of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur, which the Brazilian Ministry of Justice has kindly made available for the author.

The General Plan for Regional Security (*Plan General sobre Cooperación y Asistencia Recíproca en materia de Seguridad Regional en el Mercosur*) became effective in 1999. In this General Plan the Security Plan for the border triangle worked out as well as the Regional Security Plan from 1998. The General Plan for Regional Security represents by far the most comprehensive and furthest-reaching multilateral project of the Conference of the Home Secretaries of the extended Mercosur. Introductorily it says:

“The parallel running processes of the globalization and the regional integration lead to the stage where even the transnational dimension of the criminality proves to be increasingly more pronounced and thus more alarming. Amongst others organized groups in the sectors of drug traffic, terrorism, money laundering, smuggle, child trade, robbery and theft of vehicles, illegal dealing with radioactive material, illegal migration and environmental criminality belong to this sector. [...] In order to respond these new challenges it is necessary to act commonly and in a coordinated way on the regional level. Only by means of cooperation the different forms of the nationally and transnationally organized criminality can be contained effectively. Particularly those forms of crime that can – due to their transnational character – not be contained on the national level threaten the common subregional security to a high degree.”

For the improvement of the subregional security situation the states of the Mercosur aim to coordinate four central security political fields of function. Firstly the government bodies of security and police are intended to support each other mutually by the exchange of information. Secondly on the operative level simultaneous measures are planned to be executed for the control and repression of criminal activities. Thirdly the Home Secretaries want to improve the material equipment of the police institutions – especially in the important sectors of computer science and communication – and adjust subregionally. Finally the General Plan for Regional Security aims at a more effective employment of the personnel resources. This is planned to be achieved by further developed and coordinated forms of training as well as a broad emphasis on exchange of experience between the security and police staff of the Mercosur.

The central chapter of the General Plan for Regional Security is divided into those problem areas in which the partnership countries intend to cooperate in the future: Illegal drug trafficking, slave trade, smuggle, robbery respectively theft of vehicles, organized crime, economic and financial crime, terrorism as well as environmental criminality. Following a Brazilian initiative the Home Offices and Ministries of Justice are currently working on the transformation of the General Plan into an outline agreement. A multilateral treaty relating to international law would have to be ratified by the Parliaments of the Mercosur states. This would increase the pressure on the Congresses to adjust the national legislations to the Regional Security Plan (Oswaldo Portella, interview on May 12, 2004).

The subregional data bank for information relevant to the security (SISME) dates back to an agreement of the third Conference of the Home Secretaries in Buenos Aires in 1998. Five years later the Home Secretaries and the Ministers of Justice decided in Montevideo to implement the system still in 2004. By this the government representatives describe the exchange of information as a crucial element of an effective prosecution of transnationally acting criminals. Their financial power enables these transnationally organized groups to pursue their illegal objectives by means of advanced technologies. In order to be able to contain the organized crime effectively the government security authorities depend on technically equal equipment, especially in the fields of information and communication. The centralization of the subregional government capacities shall lead to synergy effects. The exchange of information guaranteed by the SISME is intended to lead to considerable progresses concerning the control of transnational criminality.

Besides an improved organization and intensified control of the police institutions, that are often involved in illegal activities themselves, the utilization of the Mercosur data archive in connection with coordinated administrative procedures within the home ministries of the subregion also promises a speeding up of the crime control on the operative level. The member states have got to feed completed police operations into the data bank and thereby pass them on to the partnership countries. As well as data related to persons or information on goods (i.e. arms and vehicles) linked with criminal activities.

In content the subregional information system is intended to consist of three components: In doing so data relating to persons and goods are completed by a register on criminal cases and the police operations connected with them. Data with reference to persons of the first component includes national as well as international arrest warrants, missing announcements and summons as well as entry and departure prohibitions declared by the Mercosur countries. Furthermore the SISME stores information on issued and refused visas of citizens from non-Mercosur states as well as a register of notification of persons from a third country residing in the member states.

The data relating to goods, which form the second component of the SISME, refer to confiscated vehicles, vessels and aircrafts in the first place. Moreover the model descriptions and serial numbers of seized arms are recorded and stored centrally. A subregional register for cargo containers recording the imports and exports to and from the Mercosur countries including the respective freight is intended to enable the security authorities a detailed detection of the transportation routes of the smuggled goods.

The third component of the subregional information system finally concerns a register for resolved and unresolved criminal cases by the police institutions of the Mercosur states. The stored information on police operations carried out in connection with criminal offences

contributes to the exchange of experience between the security authorities of the single states. On the basis of the SISME-data the state bodies dealing with a case or problem area can communicate with each other and decide on commonly or regionally coordinated measures on the operative level.

In order to support the operative collaboration of the police forces of the Mercosur countries the Home Secretaries signed the Agreement on Police Cooperation in the Sectors of Investigation, Prevention and Control of Criminal Offences (*Acuerdo sobre la Cooperación Policial en la Investigación, Prevención y Control de Hechos Delictivos*) at the eleventh Conference of the Home Secretaries in May 2001 in Buenos Aires. They decided the intensified collaboration between the federal polices of the Mercosur states. The exchange of information between the authorities in charge is planned for those cases, in which the preparation or execution of a criminal offence affects the majority of the Mercosur states directly or is for various reasons of interest for several states. Cooperation requests of the neighbouring police may lead to the opening of a case and the introduction to concrete investigations into persons and groups associated with criminal offences in the Mercosur area. However, a mutual exchange of information is also possible on crimes featuring repeated patterns of operation in a state respectively the *modus operandi* of the organized crime. The SISME is intended to represent the infrastructure for the exchange of information and cooperation requests between the federal polices. The police authorities use the communication media available for the time being (telex, fax, and email) until the communication system is put into complete operation. At the same time special communication mechanisms are planned to be established between the authorities in the subregion.

The transnational prosecution of criminal offenders in the Mercosur area is also settled the agreement. Policemen on duty are legitimated to cross the state border provided the criminal offender(s) had been caught *in flagranti*. In order to act on the national territory of the neighbouring country the federal police in charge of the respective scene of crime only has to inform its counterpart and ask for support to the arrest of the prosecuted criminal offender. This regulation implies a theoretically significant progress concerning the practical crime control. After all before the signing of the Mercosur agreement the prosecution authorities had to ask the International Police (Interpol) for international arrests warrant first, which was far more complicated and lengthier.

In November 2000 the eighth Conference of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur in Rio de Janeiro decided the foundation of a coordination Centre for Police Training (*Centro de Coordinación de Entrenamiento Policial del Mercosur*). The cross-disciplinary character of the coordination centre is intended to support the continuous scientific-technological development of the formation contents. On the one hand the coordination centre encourages the exchange

of experience between the national police schools; on the other hand the regional training centre is able to advise the national actors pedagogically and technically. To be precise this is about developing subregionally adjusted training schemes and evaluating the training- and practise programs carried out in the member states afterwards. For this purpose a data archive was set up, which gives an annual overview of all training programs offered by the police academies of the Mercosur. The coordination of the training programs serves the purpose of supporting common prevention- and repression measures of the police that aim at transnationally acting criminals, too.

It has to be criticized that the Home Secretaries have not assigned a seat of their own to the *Centro de Coordinación de Entrenamiento Policial del MERCOSUR*. Instead departments have been set up in the national Home Offices respectively Ministries of Justice, which are instructed with the subregional coordination. The member state holding the rotational presidency of the Conference of the Ministers appoints the Director of the Centre for Police Training. However, a leadership that changes half-yearly does not contribute to the constancy of the coordination between the national police academies and their course contents. Apart from the working group of the Conference of the Home Secretaries only a Secretariat respectively a Secretary – who the Director recruits from his own Ministry – supports the Director of the Police Training Centre.

By the subregional agreements in the sectors of training, exchange of information and operative cooperation the member states of the Mercosur have created the political frame and the instruments for the common transnational crime control. The following paragraphs will illustrate to what extent the operationalisation of the security political defaults has been successful in two central problem areas. Security experts agree on ranking the organized drug trafficking and delicts linked with it the priority problem. International terrorism on the other hand is rather considered to be a potential security risk that has to be prepared for in the best possible way. In this context the security political influence of the hegemonic power USA on the subregion plays a significant part.

Organised Drug Trafficking

Above all in the General Plan for Regional Security the Conference of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur sets a frame for the common control of the illegal drug trafficking, in which the responsible authorities of the member states are asked to realize simultaneous and coordinated anti-drug operations. At irregularly carried out common police raids in the border regions the Federal Police is in command in the national territory of which the prevention- and repression measure is realised. The partnership institutions are merely invited to send observers. Besides the selective exchange of information between the drug control authori-

ties, monthly secret briefings on a multilateral level are intended to give information on transportation routes, hidden runways, techniques of smuggling, drug laboratories, cultivation, caches, results of interrogations and the like.

Beyond the Conference of the Home Secretaries the Special Committee RED (*Reunión Especializada de Autoridades de Aplicación en Materia de Drogas, Prevención de su Uso Indébito y Rehabilitación de Dependientes de Drogas del Mercosur*) deals with the regional drug problems within the Mercosur in particular. Within the member states the National Anti-Drug Bureaus mostly based in the Presidential Office are responsible for the coordination of the subregionally coordinated control of drug production, -trafficking and use of drugs. The key tasks of the Anti-Drug Committee imply the prevention of drug abuse and the rehabilitation of drug addicts. At the same time the repression of drug offences and therefore the problem of illegal drug trafficking including the illegal activities implied (such as money laundering) are also subsumed by the generic term prevention.

The programmatic domains of the RED can be gathered from the technical Subcommittees that have so far been established for the control of the illegal trade with chemical substances, the laundering of drug funds, the reduction of the drug demand and the harmonization of the legal systems. Until now the exchange of information and regional intelligence coordination have dominated the working agenda of the RED. By these mechanisms progresses in the control of the trade with pharmaceutical products and chemical substances were meant to be achieved in particular. In order to enable a more efficient control of the trade with medicaments that are potentially used for the production of drugs, the Mercosur countries committed themselves to inform each other on the export of relevant pharmaceutical products. For this purpose national registers of the import and export of pharmaceuticals are planned to be set up in the member states. For the repression of the illegal trade with chemical drugs the Federal Police has carried out the transnational operation *Seis Fronteras* coordinated by the RED in 2002 and 2003. In the course of the coordinated raids carried out simultaneously in all Mercosur states the security officers arrested numerous drug dealers, confiscated chemical drugs and destroyed their production sites. Furthermore the government representatives stated their willingness to develop complementary strategies for the protection of their borders. The drug control strategies are equally meant to include control measures and public education regarding the risks implied by the use of drugs. In doing so the representatives of the Mercosur countries emphasize that the social factors take priority within the analysis of causes as well as within the possible solutions of the drug problems.

This realization is owed to a pilot project for the reduction of the drug demand in which related municipalities of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay participate. Each time respectively two neighbouring municipalities cooperate, the state borders of which cover a

distance of 7,100 kilometres altogether. On the one hand the integration of the border districts is intended to be supported by means of transnational activities in the sectors of prevention, police investigation and public education. On the other hand the population of the border towns is meant to be mobilised and sensitised to the drug problems. In order to achieve these aims first of all multipliers were integrated into the project via information meetings. These agents included teachers, doctors, local politicians and police officers. In a second step binational anti-drug councils were established in the municipalities, which dealt with legal and illegal aspects of the use of drugs and the drug demand in content. They also organized discussion meetings on the subject. The six months lasting pilot project ended in December 2004.

Transnational Terrorism

The foundation of a Working Group for Counterterrorism (*Grupo de Trabajo Especializado sobre Terrorismo – GTE*) had already been set up in the General Plan for Regional Security passed in 1999, thus well before the terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington. A crucial moment for the inclusion of the international terrorism in the regional security agenda can be seen in the bomb attack to the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the Israeli-Argentine Association AMIA (*Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina*) in 1994. By these attacks more than 100 people have been killed altogether in the country with the largest Jewish community in South America. The Israeli secret service Mossad holds the Islamic Republic Iran and the Hisbollah responsible for the bomb attacks. The already mentioned *Comando Tripartito de la Triple Frontera* was founded in 1996 as a result of this up until today unresolved crime. Moreover, the just described transnational security cooperation has been started after that.

It is correct that the Anti-Terrorism Working Group (GTE) is getting unequally more attention since the Common Declaration of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur from September 28, 2001. In this declaration the Ministers reacted to the Al Quaida-attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and announced a far-reaching collaboration against this new quality of terrorist danger. Therefore the GTE was completed by a Permanent Working Group (*Grupo de Trabajo Permanente – GTP*) via modification of the General Plan for Regional Security. Since then the GTE has been subordinated to the GTP. The meetings of the counterterrorism experts take place in the context of the GTE. The participating experts include representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of Finance and Justice, agents of the intelligence services as well as counterterrorism- and secret service departments of the Federal Police. Within these committees the representatives of the Mercosur governments

coordinate their positions concerning the problem of global terrorism in international forums such as the OAS and the UNO.

On the GTE's and GTP's initiative the Conference of the Home Secretaries prepared at least three crucial multilateral treaties: *The Agreement on the Operative Cooperation of the Police Intelligence Services in Counterterrorism*, *the Agreement on the Cooperation in the Control of Transnational Criminal Activities linked with Illegal Air Traffic* as well as *the Agreement on the Fight against Corruption in the Border Regions* between the Mercosur states.

The actual tasks of the Working Groups (GTE/GTP), meeting twice a month since 2000, include the exchange and the analysis of information as well as the evaluation of current operations concerning potential terrorist activities in the Mercosur area. In practice this is about permanently observing relevant sectors of the organized crime (arms trade, drug trafficking, money laundering) and investigating, if there are indications of links to terrorist groups (Robson Robin da Silva, interview on May 21, 2004).

The operative part of counterterrorism is controlled by the national secret services: The Chilean *Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia* (ANI) founded only in 2004, the Argentine *SIDE (Secretaria de Inteligencia del Estado Argentino)* and in Brazil the Department of Intelligence Service of the Federal Police (*Diretoria de Inteligência Policial*) and especially its Counterterrorism Department SANTER (*Secretaria Antiterrorista*). However, even the Secret Service Central in the Brazilian Presidential Office ABIN as well as the military intelligence services are integrated into the terrorism control and -prevention. The Working Group for Biological Defence (*Grupo de Trabalho Biodefesa*) of the ABIN deals with scenarios that anticipate biological and chemical terrorist attacks. There are close contacts between the intelligence services of the other Mercosur states. Representatives of the national intelligence services meet for regular conferences as well as ad-hoc gathering, if the situation requires it. The persons in charge rather proceed on the assumption of a possible attack on Israeli, US-American or British institutions situated in the subregion than on Brazilian targets, for instance (José Antonio de Macedo Soares, interview on May 14, 2004).

In order to stabilise communication channels the Conference of the Home Secretaries instructed the Anti-Terrorism Working Groups to develop an integrated information system with person related data about members of terrorist alignments and those persons that support terrorist activities. This information intended for the internal use should only be made available for the judicial authorities in the state of emergency. This condition raises questions concerning the national control, since the national intelligences are not really controlled by their Parliaments either. For the time being the General Plan for Regional Security

does neither plan to feed data relating to terrorism into the subregional information system SISME nor data relating to all other delicts. Additionally the GTP and GTE established institutionalised communication mechanisms (*Sistema de Consulta Rápida*) to guarantee the immediate communication of the anti-terrorism experts of the Mercosur states in case of urgent dangers respectively unexpectedly executed terrorist attacks. For this purpose weekly conferences of the GTP (Tuesday 10 am to 12 noon) and the GTE (Friday 10 am to 12 noon) supported by communication media are taking place continuously. Every two months the GTE works out an evaluation of the situation, in which the risks regarding potential terrorist activities in the Mercosur area are assessed. So far no particular trouble spot for the states in the South of Latin America could be discovered.

In September 2004 the Ministers of Defence of the extended Mercosur discussed the future role of the intelligence services of the Armed Forces in the context of counterterrorism in Buenos Aires (see *La Nación*, September 14, 2004). On this occasion the Argentine Minister of Defence Pampuro spoke for an increased integration of the military attachés into the terrorism prevention. They should intensify their cooperation with the military intelligence services of their receiving states, particularly in the Mercosur region. The then Brazilian Minister of Defence Viegas pointed out that the containment of terrorism was not a purely military task. Therefore an improved coordination between the military and civil intelligence services of the Mercosur states was necessary. Viegas' Chilean colleague Michelle Bachelet took a similar view by emphasizing the "great variety of the anti-terrorism measures available" (*ibid.*) and pointing out that the military means were not at all given priority by this.

4. Conclusions

Since the transitions to democracy Argentina, Brazil and Chile have managed to overcome the anarchic basic condition of the international relations postulated by the realistic theory for the most part by cooperative government and social interactions. The subregional institutions play a central role in guaranteeing the peaceful change in the intraregional cooperation within Southern Latin America. First and foremost are the political and economic institutions of the Mercosur: The Mercosur Council, the Group of the Mercosur, the Technical Secretariat, the Appellate Court and the Committee of Permanent Representatives. In the second line are the Mercosur authorities that are responsible for security policy cooperation: The conference of the Home Secretaries and Ministers of Justice, the Foreign Political Consultation Mechanism (FCCP), the Anti-Drug Committee (RED) as well as the Counter-

Terrorism Working Groups (GTP/GTE). A third type are the bilateral institutions in charge of defence policy cooperation between the ABC states: The Brazilian-Argentine Consultation and Coordination Mechanism for International Security- and Defence Affairs (MCC/MAE), the Argentine-Chilean Permanent Security Committee (COMPERSEG) as well as Brazil's Bilateral Working Groups for Defence Policy (GTBD).

The results of the analysis of the security and defence policy institutions show that these are on the whole "strong and disseminated enough in order to generate an expectation of a peaceful change over a long period of time" (Deutsch 1961: 98). It is true that the defence political cooperation mechanisms have been attested democratic deficiencies, because military actors are over-proportionally represented in these committees. However, by reversing it positively especially the transnational cooperation of the military in the MCC/MAE and the GTBD promotes common, social processes of learning and identity building of the military representatives from the ABC states. The military nationalism and the overestimation of the term of national sovereignty in the military academies of the region (Nunn 1997: 12) can be regarded as cooperation hampering qualifiers. The extent of collective identity forming between the Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean generals cannot be finally assessed, which is partially due to the non-public character of the bilateral cooperation mechanisms. The central criterion established by Deutsch (1961: 98) for achieving a sense of community "[...] that there has to be agreement at least in one point: That common social problems can be and have to be solved by procedures of peaceful change" is already fulfilled by the military and defence political cooperation by definition.

On the whole even in view of the common values and identities that Deutsch defined as components of a security community the common grounds between the ABC states prevail. In this connection the "we-feeling" of the states of Southern Latin America follows from the common esteem for market economy, democracy and human rights. Additionally it is increased by the poverty of great parts of the population and the high income concentration as common social problems connected with it. The societies of the ABC states had been attested increasing mutual interdependence, especially in the sector of the subregional economic relations in the context of the Mercosur. The increase of trade and direct investments as well as the formation of regional networks between enterprises, company unions, chambers of commerce and trade unions had led to this conclusion. Opinion surveys by which the population of the ABC states has mostly got a positive image of one another today are an indicator of developing collective identities in Southern Latin America. Another mutuality of the governments implies their preference for multilateral solutions and the high esteem for the international law within the international relations.

Finally the analysis of *intraregional relations* had awarded generally centripetal effects on the subregional cooperation to the non-military threats. The increasing diplomatic concertation (agreed votes in the UN Security Council, common diplomatic representations in third countries) and processes of institutionalisation of security and defence policies also imply a considerable contribution to increasing the degree of mutual interdependence between the ABC states in the sectors of foreign, security and defence policy. All in all, the mutual interdependence of the member states of the security community has to be rated higher than the interlocking of the ABC states with external actors.

On the political level the Conferences of the Home Secretaries and the FCCP are the most important forums for dialogue between the member states concerning transnational threats and common means of their control. Since the end of the 1990s the security agreements signed at the semi-annual Conferences of the Home Secretaries have grown into a comprehensive normative catalogue, which points to an advanced degree of institutionalisation of the security cooperation in the Mercosur. The high number of working groups and special committees employed by the Conferences of the Home Secretaries are now forming an institutional structure of their own that is comparable with the economic-political cooperation mechanisms of the integration alliance.

The main tasks of the FCCP are the coordination of the foreign and security policies of the Mercosur states and the development of common positions in negotiations with external actors. The degree of institutionalisation of this committee is still relatively small compared to the Conference of the Home Secretaries, but in spring 2002 the Mercosur Council has assigned far-reaching security policy competences to the FCCP. It remains to be seen how the FCCP will use its coordination function (i.e. between the Conference of the Home Secretaries and the RED). The Consultation and Concertation Forum has undoubtedly the potential of a common foreign and security policy of the Mercosur. If the governments of the Mercosur states pursue this political objective, the mentioned cooperation mechanisms are the infrastructure that can put it into effect.

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