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Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era

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Abstract

Previous research, which has focused mostly on pre-1990 dynamics, has shown that sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. Given this finding, it is puzzling that democratization has become the most common goal of sanctions issued against authoritarian states. This paper studies how sanctions have affected democratization in targeted countries since the end of the Cold War and asks whether “democratic sanctions,” those that explicitly aim to promote democracy, are in fact counterproductive. Contrary to the earlier research, this analysis demonstrates that sanctions do not generally decrease the level of democracy in targeted countries. Using a new data set covering sanctions for the period 1990–2010 and cross-sectional time-series analysis, the study shows that sanctions have an insignificant but positive democratic effect. More importantly, it finds that “democratic sanctions” have a statistically significant positive effect on democratic development in targeted countries. This positive outcome can be explained by the smaller selection effect associated with this specific sanction type. The high cost of conceding to “democratic sanctions” makes authoritarian regimes less likely to give in to senders’ demands before sanctions are implemented. The high-cost argument is corroborated by a supplementary test that demonstrates that democratic sanctions in particular make authoritarian institutions and rulers more instable.

Keywords: sanctions, authoritarian regimes, persistence, regime change, ruler exit, concession costs, post-Cold War era

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Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era

Christian von Soest and Michael Wahman

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1 Introduction

Hastings Banda was one of the most repressive dictators in one of Africa's poorest countries, Malawi.¹ Under Banda's rule, which began at independence in 1964, the country depended almost completely on foreign donors. Against this background, it is puzzling that Banda

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stubbornly resisted mounting pressure from the US and the countries of the European Union in the early 1990s to liberalize and introduce multiparty elections. The US Congress sent a clear signal in 1990 when it tied the continuation of aid to improvements in Malawi's human rights record. However, it was only when the US and other donors actually froze \$70 million in development aid in May 1992 that Banda's regime finally consented. When the military, the most important instrument of repression, withdrew its support for Banda, he was forced to call a national referendum that set the stage for multiparty elections in 1993, which, in turn, removed him from office (Posner 1995).

Malawi's long-time ruler was not willing to react to threats, but he did respond to imposed sanctions, which had the potential to immediately harm the donor-dependent country. Although there have clearly also been cases where international sanctions have not been successful, the Malawian case is one example in which sanctions have induced democratization in the post-Cold War era.

The end of the Cold War initiated a dramatic period of global democratization. The democratic regime type went from an empirical anomaly in the 1980s to a global norm in the 1990s. As the democratic regime type spread across the world (Huntington 1991), the international community more forcefully voiced concerns about violations of democratic norms in authoritarian regimes around the globe.

The European Union and the United States have frequently implemented sanctions against authoritarian regimes in order to pressure these regimes to democratize (Cox and Drury 2006). Despite the fact that the UN cannot openly aim for regime change (Chapter VII), it has frequently used sanctions to achieve democratization. This paper asks whether economic, political, military and diplomatic sanctions on the part of the UN, the US and the EU have contributed to the process of democratization since the end of the Cold War and, more importantly, whether sanctions specifically intended to achieve democratization in targeted countries have generally been successful.

In this paper we argue that the effect of imposed sanctions is strongly related to the expected costs of conceding to the sender's goals. In authoritarian regimes, conceding to demands for democratization is especially costly. As authoritarian regimes rely on means such as vote rigging, media censorship or the suppression of the opposition to stay in power, autocrats cannot concede to democratic sanctions at the threat stage without jeopardizing their own political survival. Therefore, they may prefer to bear the consequences of costly sanctions rather than democratize, expecting that not all sanctions will succeed at destabilizing the political system.

In the empirical section we introduce a new global data set of sanctions from the UN, the US and the EU that covers the period 1990–2010. The data set is used in a number of cross-sectional time-series regression models to assess the impact of different forms of sanctions on democratization in authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War era. Contrary to the research on earlier time periods, we find that sanctions have not had a generally negative effect in the

post-Cold War era. In contrast, the models show that all sanctions had a generally positive, yet insignificant effect on democratic development in authoritarian countries. More importantly, the analysis shows a significantly positive effect for sanctions explicitly intended to promote democratization. In a supplementary test we show that democratic sanctions are more likely than other types of sanctions to lead to change in leadership and change in regime type, making them particularly costly for autocratic incumbents.

The paper proceeds as follows. After discussing the changed global environment for sanctions since the end of the Cold War, we discuss the importance of sanctions' goals for the democratic outcome (Section 2). We then present the data and research design in Section 3, followed by the discussion of empirical results and the supplementary test on sanctions and regime stability in Section 4. The conclusion discusses the implications of our findings.

2 Sanctions and the Changed Global Environment after the Cold War

The existing research has hardly reflected on how the end of Cold War antagonism between the Western and the Eastern blocs created new conditions for the operation of sanctions (Collins 2009a, 2009b). This is surprising given the profound shifts attributed to this global watershed in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall (most explicitly Fukuyama 1992).

Generally, the structural attributes of the international system have become more favorable for democratization. The confrontation between two poles, each of which aimed to defend and enlarge its area of influence, has been replaced by unipolar US dominance of the international system. For some time, there seemed to be no economic, political or ideological alternative to the democratic and capitalist model of the West (Diamond 2000; Levitsky and Way 2010). In addition, the US and its allies have become far more assertive than during the Cold War in actively promoting democracy at the global level (Burnell 2000; Carothers 1999). Consequently, "Western liberalism's triumph" (Levitsky and Way 2002: 61) has induced the global spread of democracy and of the institution of elections, even in authoritarian regimes (Lindberg 2009; Schedler 2006). Although the introduction of elections in many new countries has often not led to liberal democracy, it has opened up new avenues for political contestation (e.g. Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006).

Second, the end of the Cold War antagonism has been accompanied by ever-increasing global economic, political, technological, communicative and social linkages (on the concept of linkage see Levitsky and Way 2010: 43–50). Authoritarian countries are far more integrated with and dependent on the global economy than during the Cold War. Furthermore, authoritarian rulers' human rights violations or other actions quickly receive global attention through various channels, be they transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1999), TV coverage, the Internet, or social networks such as Facebook. Despite the fact that China, Russia and, increasingly, assertive new global and regional powers are competing for influence in post-Cold War geopolitics and that authoritarian regimes may still recruit alternative

trading partners, the prospects for democratization are now far better than they were in the post-Cold War period.

These global shifts also have implications for how and why sanctions are used. First, Western states and UN Security Council members have become more inclined to impose sanctions in order to confront undesirable behavior or to destabilize a targeted unit. Sanctions have become more multilateral. As the fundamental US–Soviet antagonism has vanished, the number of UN Security Council resolutions applying Chapter VII instruments has risen sharply. The UN authorized more sanctions in the 1990s than in its entire history up to that time (Jentleson 2000: 156).

Second, the United States, the European Union and – to some extent – the United Nations have increasingly used sanctions to strengthen democracy and human rights globally. More than 50 percent of all the sanctions directed towards autocratic regimes recorded in the new global data set on post-Cold War sanctions (see below) explicitly aim to bring about democratization in the authoritarian countries targeted. According to Collins (2009a: 77), for the US the “most frequent factor for the initiation of economic sanctions was to foster democracy in states abroad.” In cases such as Guatemala (1993), the US was able to swiftly forge an international coalition that imposed sanctions in reaction to President Serrano’s decision to dissolve Congress and the judiciary (Christensen Bjune and Petersen 2010; Crawford 2001: 194).

Third, sanctions became more targeted during the 1990s, a fact that the research to date has not adequately reflected. As a consequence of the devastating humanitarian effects of the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq in the early 1990s, senders now almost exclusively utilize targeted sanctions (Drezner 2011). In contrast to comprehensive sanctions, which treat nations as unitary actors, these measures target particular individuals or groups (for an overview Biersteker et al. 2005). However, existing research has rarely analyzed the specific effects that targeted sanctions exert on the power base in autocratic countries subjected to them (Brzoska 2001; Cortright and Lopez 2002; Drezner 2011; Eriksson 2011; Peksen and Drury 2010; Tostensen and Bull 2002).

2.1 The Effectiveness of Sanctions and Their Effect on Democratization

Sanctions have a bad reputation. Hufbauer et al. (1990, 2007), who have compiled the most extensive data set on economic sanctions to date, found that these coercive measures were successful only in one-third of all cases (for a similar assessment see Cortright and Lopez 2000). Sanctions which specifically aim for regime destabilization or democratization show a similar success score of 31 percent (Hufbauer et al. 2007: 158–159).

However, these findings are heavily contested. Most authors (Drury 1998; Pape 1997, 1998) maintain that the success of sanctions is overstated, as Hufbauer et al.’s bivariate approach does not allow for the assessment of other plausible explanations for changes in target states’ behavior (Askari et al. 2003; Bonetti 1991; Haass 1998; Jing et al. 2003; cf. also

Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992).² Traditionally, the research has focused on the interaction between sanction sender and target (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Hufbauer et al. 2007); less attention has been given to the internal dynamics in the target country and the repercussions of sanctions on the rulers' power bases. This is a key reason for the ambiguous or even contradictory results of early sanctions research.

It is important to acknowledge the difference between the economic and political costs of sanctions and, in turn, that economic costs do not necessarily translate into political costs for targeted authoritarian regimes. According to the traditional "punishment theory" (Lektzian and Souva 2007: 850), the economic harm caused by sanctions directly translates into political pressure, which forces the ruler to comply. A certain level of deprivation induces citizens to challenge the current regime (Kerr and Gaisford 1994). In other words, "the greater the cost of sanctions to the target, the greater the likelihood they will succeed" (Drury 1998: 508). As early as 1967, Galtung (1967) contemptuously termed these expectations the "naive theory of sanctions." In all regimes, "the key to sanctions success is to generate political costs for the target regime's winning coalition" (Lektzian and Souva 2007: 867).

Current research (e.g. Allen 2008; Bapat and Morgan 2009; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Escribà-Folch 2012; Lektzian and Souva 2003; Peksen and Drury 2010) has shed more light on the interplay between sanctions and the dynamics in autocratic regimes. Yet the question of what kind of costs different sanctions impose on autocratic rulers warrants more detailed and systematic analysis (see Drury and Li 2006; Hufbauer et al. 2007: 55–64; Lektzian and Souva 2007). We take it as axiomatic that actors in a position of power want to retain this position (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and that the highest cost to autocratic leaders is the destabilization of their rule through democratization, regime change or the removal of rulers (Marinov 2005).


2.2 The Importance of Sanction Goals for Democratic Outcomes

As discussed in the previous section, the existing research has generally shown a rather low success rate for economic sanctions. To explain this general ineffectiveness, a growing number of authors have suggested that it is problematic to look only at actually imposed sanctions (Drezner 1999, 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004; Morgan et al. 2009). According to these scholars, it is likely that the cases where sanctions would be most effective end as early as the threat stage. If a regime judges the expected cost of sanctions to be high or even regime-threatening, it will concede to the sender's demands before the sanction is actually put in place. Measuring only the effect of actually imposed sanctions therefore introduces a significant selection bias to the study of sanctions.

2 In contrast, some scholars stress that Hufbauer et al. underestimate the effectiveness of sanctions because they only consider those sanctions that were actually imposed and not those that were already successful in changing the targets' behavior at the threat stage (Blake and Klemm 2006; Drezner 1999, 2003).

The logic in the selection-bias literature is central in hypothesizing the relationship between the success rate of imposed sanctions and different sanction goals. A simplified sanction episode involves a sender and a target.³ Normally, we would expect regimes to give in to the sender's demands if $EC_c < EC_r$, where EC_c represents the expected *cost of complying* with the sender's demands and EC_r represents the expected *cost of rejecting* the sender's demands. The costs of rejection can be both economic or political in nature, with the highest political cost for the authoritarian ruler being the loss of power. The graph below (Figure 1) illustrates the circumstances under which we would expect a target to concede to or to reject the sender's demands.

Figure 1: When Would a Target Reject the Sender's Demands?



Source: Authors' compilation.

EC_c is determined to a large extent by the credibility of the sender's threats (Hovi et al. 2005); however, the nature of the sender's demand is equally important. The literature has distinguished between minor and major sanction goals (Drury and Li 2006; Hufbauer et al. 2007). Minor goals have a low EC_c , whereas major goals have a higher EC_c . Analyzing the Chinese case, Drury and Li (2006) argued that targets are more likely to give in to sanction threats when the goals are minor.

Sanctions research has also dealt with varying sanction costs for *senders* and how these costs influence the selection of targets as well as the sanctions' prospects of success (Eaton and Engers 1999; Jing et al. 2003; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Simon 1995). Acknowledging the relevance of sender costs for other research questions, we have no reason to believe that the costs for senders vary systematically between democratic sanctions and sanctions which

³ This is a simplified situation, as a sanction episode can also involve several senders, which often complicates the dynamics and causes coordination problems among senders (Drezner 2000).

pursue other goals. This would influence the selection of targets and bias results. Hence, in this article we consider potential selection effects on the target side.⁴

When talking about authoritarian regimes, there is no sanction category that introduces a higher cost of concession than those demanding democratization. The instigation of democratic reform represents a huge threat to the authority of authoritarian leaders as these leaders rely on various authoritarian measures to stay in power. The political costs to a military regime of introducing civilian rule, to a one-party regime of allowing political opposition, or to an electoral authoritarian regime of arranging free and fair elections are normally detrimental. Therefore, authoritarian rulers “resist political openings for as long as possible and seek to manage the process of transition only after it has been forced on them” (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 83).⁵

According to the logic illustrated in Figure 1, the high cost of concession associated with democratic sanctions for authoritarian regimes (destabilization or even loss of power) makes these regimes willing to accept a high rejection cost. The highest conceivable EC_T occurs in those cases where imposed sanctions are likely to bring down the incumbent regime (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Marinov 2005), but even if sanctions are likely to lead to regime change, authoritarian regimes might still reject calls to democratize before they are put in place. Although the expected general cost of rejection might be high (for instance, economic loss incurred by trade sanctions), authoritarian leaders may be prepared to accept these uncertain costs rather than the certain cost of losing authoritarian control if they concede at the threat stage. This follows Allen’s insight that “under certain circumstances, ... sanctions are costly for states but not for leaders” (Allen 2008: 925; see also Lektzian and Souva 2007). This argument does not imply that all democratic sanctions inevitably come with a high cost of rejection, but it does suggest that the high cost of concession (certain loss of authoritarian control, if not regime change) provides a strong incentive to tolerate the most costly political, military, diplomatic or economic sanctions because their effects on the authoritarian regime and leadership survival are not clear from the outset. In other words, in a real game, neither the sender nor the target can be sure *ex ante* that imposed democratic sanctions will succeed in achieving their targets.

The existing research has been skeptical regarding the potential of achieving democratization through the use of sanctions (Peksen and Drury 2010). It is indeed true that repression might initially increase in response to sanctions, but the pressure can become too intense for the authoritarian regime to handle, ultimately leading to its eventual breakdown (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Marinov 2005). Sanctions are likely to hurt the political elite’s economic interests (or those of the selectorate, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and hence cause

4 Note that we control for economic strength and further factors that characterize the target; see further discussion in the “Control Variables” section.

5 Arguing from a game-theoretical perspective, Smith (1995) also comes to the conclusion that only those sanctions with minor demands, which the target can concede to at minimal cost, will end at the threat stage.

elite defection (Geddes 1999). Moreover, if economic hardship is passed on to the population, this could inspire popular protests and decrease the likelihood that electoral authoritarian regimes are reelected (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010).

Based on the theory laid out above, we expect that democratic sanctions materialize more often than sanctions with other goals, despite their regime-threatening costs. The following two hypotheses follow from this discussion:

H1a: Democratic sanctions increase the level of democracy in authoritarian regimes.

H1b: Democratic sanctions increase the level of democracy in authoritarian regimes more than those sanctions aiming to achieve other goals.

Moreover, the increased frequency of democratic sanctions and the changed structural attributes of the international system in the post-Cold War era should affect the general democratic effect of sanctions (regardless of goal) in authoritarian regimes. Contrary to earlier research (Peksen and Drury 2010), we do not expect a general negative effect of sanctions since the end of the Cold War.

H2: Sanctions have not generally decreased the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian regimes since the end of the Cold War.

As outlined above, we believe that the positive relationship between sanctions and democratization is due to the higher frequency of regime-threatening sanctions in connection with democratic goals. In some cases authoritarian regimes might reevaluate the sender's demands and concede before they are ousted from office. When they do not, we expect greater regime instability to be associated with democratic sanctions, as in the case of Malawi's Hastings Banda. An irregular change in leadership or a change in regime type in response to sanctions does not always result in democratization, but it does open up space for political competition. If sanctions destabilize authoritarian regimes, they are also likely, on average, to increase the level of democracy. We therefore also test the following hypotheses:

H3: Democratic sanctions increase the likelihood of an irregular change in leadership.

H4: Democratic sanctions increase the likelihood of a change in regime type.

3 Data and Research Design

Methodologically, this study utilizes cross-sectional time-series analysis to investigate how sanctions affect democratization in authoritarian regimes. Much of the early sanctions literature, which has concentrated on the effectiveness of sanctions, has measured the dependent variable as a dichotomy (e.g. Hufbauer et al. 2007) where sanctions either succeeded in obtaining their intended goals or failed to do so.⁶ These qualitative dichotomous judgments

6 For their success measure, Hufbauer et al. (2007) multiply sanctions' "policy result" by "sanctions' contribution" (assessed on a 1–4 scale, respectively), using 9 as the threshold for success.

have often been the subject of debate (e.g. Pape 1997); these debates once again show how dichotomous variables might increase the magnitude of measurement errors (Elkins 2000).

We understand democracy as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. Thus, our dependent variable measures the gradual change in the level of democracy. An alternative would be to only measure the actual transition to democracy. However, doing so would seriously truncate the dependent variable and would entail the risk of missing democratic improvements in the most autocratic contexts (Collier and Adcock 2001; Elkins 2000; Verkuilen and Munck 2002).

To account for changes in the level of democracy, we utilize a combined Freedom House and Polity IV score. Following Hadenius and Teorell (2005, 2007), we adopt the combined score to compensate for the individual shortcomings of the two indices.⁷ The combined score is derived by computing the average Freedom House political rights and civil liberties score (reversed and transformed to a 0–10 scale), and combining it with the revised combined autocracy and democracy score from the Polity IV data (also converted to a 0–10 scale). The change in the level of democracy is calculated as $\text{demo}_t - \text{demo}_{t-1}$.

As a supplementary test, we test whether democratic sanctions destabilize authoritarian regimes, and whether they do so to a greater degree than other sanctions. This

(a) sheds light on how democratic sanctions work in authoritarian regimes and how they influence democratization and

(b) substantiates our argument that democratic sanctions are particularly costly.

We run a series of conditional fixed-effects logistic regressions. One set of these models uses leader exit⁸ as the dependent variable, and one uses regime change, as recorded in the Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman (2012) regime data set.⁹

All authoritarian regimes that existed in the period 1990–2010 are included in the sample. According to Hadenius and Teorell's (2007) classification, a country is regarded as authoritarian in a certain year if its democracy score is lower than 7.5 on the 10-point democracy index described above. The sample does not include any democratic regimes, except those that entered the democratic-regime category during a sanction episode.¹⁰ Not including these cases

7 This combined FH/Polity IV outperforms all rival indices in an independent assessment (Hadenius and Teorell 2005).

8 The variable is dichotomous and shows whether there has been a change in the national chief executive during a given year. Data is taken from Banks (2012) and has been updated for the years after 2006 (a similar source is the Archigos data set, see Goemans et al. 2009). The data has also been censored in those instances where leaders have changed due to death by natural causes (for example, Bahrain 1999) and where a leader has stepped down due to constitutional term limits (for example, Russia 2008). We do, however – in contrast to Chiozza and Goemans (2004) – include those cases where the president has stepped down due to term limits but where the chosen successor has lost to an oppositional candidate (see for example Kenya 2002).

9 A regime change is observed when a country transitions from one regime type to another (either to a different authoritarian regime type or to democracy). Regime change relates to the regime categories in Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman's (2012) regime data set, according to the *regimeny* categorization. The categorization distinguishes between 20 different regime categories.

10 These countries stay in the sample until the last year that sanctions were imposed.

in the sample would have excluded the cases where sanctions have been most effective in creating democratization. All in all, the sample consists of 2079 country years; sanctions against an authoritarian regime were imposed in 532 of these country years.

3.1 Introducing a New Data Set on Post-Cold War Sanctions

To assess the impact of “democratic sanctions” on autocratic regimes, we need to clearly delineate them from other restrictive measures. In the following discussion we briefly introduce the main tenets of the new global data set on post-Cold War sanctions (Portela and von Soest 2012).

The data set is composed of the entire universe of sanction regimes imposed by the UN, the US and the EU – the main sanction senders – in the period from 1990 to 2010, including those sanction regimes that were in place already in 1990 and those episodes which are still ongoing (see Appendix 2). Given that the investigation explores the impact of sanctions on authoritarian regimes, the data set does not list measures against democracies and also does not include sanctions directed at nonstate actors. It includes all countries subjected to sanctions that the Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman data set (2012) has coded as being “autocratic regimes” at the start of the sanction episode.

In contrast to the valuable TIES data set by Morgan, Bapat and Krustev (Bapat and Morgan 2009; Morgan et al. 2009), we only recognize imposed sanctions; we exclude threatened sanctions that have failed to materialize. This decision is based on the theoretical expectation, outlined above, that democratic sanctions potentially result in such extensive costs for autocratic rulers that these rulers cannot afford to concede at the threat stage. Doing so would effectively mean that they weaken themselves or even relinquish power.

For our purposes, we have to go beyond the commonly used data set from Hufbauer et al. (2007). To start with, the Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (HSE) data set effectively stops assessing sanction cases as of 2005, and even for the cases before this date, the assessment is inconclusive. Secondly, and more importantly, we have to depart from their coding of the ending of sanction episodes. True, “the exact dates of onset and termination of sanctions episodes are often indistinct” (Hufbauer et al. 2007: 48–49), yet for our analysis it is important to demarcate the end of an episode as the point not only when the sanctions are lifted but also when the sender’s goal changes substantially.

Thirdly, in contrast to HSE, in our data set we divide all goals into coherent categories. We consider democratization to have been intended when the imposing documents or senders’ statements contain the demand for

- 1) new elections,
- 2) the modification of the constitution or the electoral code,
- 3) the admission of an international electoral observation mission,
- 4) the restoration of a democratically elected leader,
- 5) the recognition of electoral results,

- 6) the recognition of rights and freedoms directly linked to the electoral process (such as freedom of assembly and expression), or
- 7) the protection of those human rights that allow for electoral competition (Portela and von Soest 2012).

All of these demands severely limit rulers' leeway to apply autocratic means. While categories 1 to 5 deal with several practices that interrupt the democratic process, categories 6 and 7 reflect the imposition of sanctions in response to the breaching of human rights that are closely linked to the democratic process (Portela 2010). Sanctions are also categorized as democratic when the sender expresses the explicit desire to bring about democratic regime change in the autocratic regime (see Table 1).

Adapting the model proposed by Charron (2011: 7–11; see also Hufbauer et al. 2007: 52–55), we classify the goals of sanctions according to broad categories. We differentiate between the following objectives:

- 1) democratization (as defined above),
- 2) the supporting of human rights,¹¹
- 3) the fight against narcotics,
- 4) the ending of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
- 5) the termination of bellicosities or the establishment of peace agreements,
- 6) the fight against terrorism.¹²

Table 1: Democratic and Nondemocratic Goals of Sanctions

<i>Democratization-Related Demands</i>	<i>Other Demands</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Holding of new elections – Modification of the constitution or the electoral code – Admission of an international electoral observation mission – Restoration of a democratically elected leader – Recognition of electoral results – Recognition of rights and freedoms directly linked to the electoral process (such as freedom of assembly and expression) – Protection of human rights connected to electoral competition – Regime change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Support for human rights (all human rights which are not directly related to the democratic process) – Fighting of narcotics – Ending of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – Termination of bellicosities or establishment of peace agreements – Fighting of terrorism

Source: Authors' compilation.

¹¹ The democratization category contains the quest for those human rights directly connected to the democratic process, whereas this category includes all other human rights.

¹² Establishing the main goals includes some subjective assessment based on the documents imposing sanctions, as well as further primary and secondary literature.

We exclude measures related to trade disputes (cf. in contrast the TIES data set Morgan et al. 2009). The imposition of these measures follows a trade policy rationale and their use is – for WTO member states – regulated under the WTO framework. Often, senders use these trade-related measures solely in retaliation for other trade measures initiated by the target. Therefore, the dynamics of trade disputes generally have fewer implications for regime persistence than do measures connected to other issues (Pape 1997).

Extending the existing large-N research, which has focused almost exclusively on economic sanctions, we include economic (for example, restrictions on exports and imports, aid sanctions), political (for example, restrictive measures to enforce other sanctions), military (for example, arms embargoes) and diplomatic (for example, the recalling of ambassadors) sanctions in the data set. For our intensity measure, we differentiate dichotomously between intense and nonintense sanctions. The key question for this differentiation is as follows: How likely is it that individuals other than members of the autocratic ruling elite (“innocents”) will be affected by the sanctions? The higher the probability, the higher the intensity of the measures. Table 2 shows which sanction types are coded as intense and nonintense measures.

Table 2: Intense and Nonintense Sanctions

<i>Intense Sanctions</i>	<i>Nonintense Sanctions</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Aid sanctions – Commodity embargoes – Flight bans – Financial sanctions – Comprehensive trade embargoes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Targeted sanctions, affecting only designated individuals and entities – Sanctions directed towards the military – Diplomatic sanctions

Source: Authors’ compilation.

In contrast to Hufbauer et al. (1990, 2007), Drury (1998), Morgan and Schwebach (1997) and others, we do not estimate the economic costs of sanctions, as the welfare loss on the part of the target country – for instance, measured by the aggregate national product loss over time – is very difficult to attribute to sanctions due to multiple influencing factors (see also Pape 1997).

We have transformed the data set into a cross-sectional time-series format that includes all authoritarian regimes for the period 1990–2010 (Hadenius et al. 2012). The main independent variables in the analysis are

- 1) whether a country was subjected to sanctions in a given year and
- 2) whether sanctions with explicitly democratic goals were imposed.

3.2 Control Variables

The issuing of sanctions comes with costs not only for the target but also for the senders – for instance, export and import losses. Senders are thus less likely to introduce sanctions against

richer and bigger countries and those well integrated in the global economy, since sanctioning such countries would yield higher economic costs for the sender (e.g. Lektzian and Souva 2007; Nooruddin 2002). As these economic variables have also been associated with democratization and the stability of political regimes (Teorell 2010), they must be included as controls in the statistical models.

Boix (2003) argues that smaller countries are generally more likely to democratize. In smaller countries capital holders are less afraid of democratization, since fixed assets can more easily be transferred out of the country. Our models hence include a measure of logged *population size* (Heston et al. 2009).¹³

The democratization literature is inconsistent in its theoretical expectations of how trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect democratization (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Bollen 1983; Gasiorowski 1988). However, a cross-sectional time-series analysis by Li and Reuveny (2003) showed a significantly negative effect for both. More importantly, the economic integration or linkage of countries with the world market (Levitsky and Way 2010) might be a powerful predictor of how likely it is that a country will be subjected to sanctions in the first place. Some authors have argued that less integrated countries are more likely to face sanctions (McLean and Whang 2010). FDI inflows and trade also point towards the stability of countries, with the expectation being that higher levels of FDI and trade indicate institutional strength and high levels of regime stability (Williamson 2000). We use the data from the World Development Indicators to account for *FDI* and *trade* in the models.

In accordance with classical modernization theory, we expect a positive relationship between the level of economic development and the level of democracy (Lipset 1959). However, making predictions for the dynamic settings tested in this paper is difficult. According to later versions of modernization theory, economic development does not increase the likelihood of democratization but rather decreases the risk of democratic breakdown and thereby increases regime stability (Przeworski et al. 2000). Since our period of measurement is the post-Cold War era, 1990–2010, most of the richest countries were already democratic by the first year of measurement. Therefore, we might not see a significantly positive effect of the level of economic development on democratization. Nevertheless, excluding this variable would potentially bias the models' estimates; we thus introduce a measure for *GDP/capita* (WDI) in all models.¹⁴

Finally, we also include a measure for *civil wars*, since sanctions are often used to pressure foreign regimes to stop internal conflicts. Perhaps slightly counterintuitively, civil conflicts have often been associated with increased levels of democracy in the empirical literature. Previous authors have suggested that elections have often been used to mediate civil conflicts and that, as a consequence, a large proportion of post-Second World War democratization pro-

13 Data is primarily derived from Heston, Summers and Aten (2009). Missing values have been imputed using data from the World Development Indicators (2011) and the United Nations (2009).

14 Missing values are imputed from Gleditsch (2002).

cesses were initiated in the aftermath of or during a civil war (Bermeo 2003; Wantchekon 2004). For this variable we use data from the UCDP/PRIO data set (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

4 Results

As stated in the theory section, democratization is only one of several goals set out by Western countries when they issue sanctions against authoritarian regimes. The theoretical argument in this paper suggests that the goal of sanctions should have important consequences for the democratic outcome. Democratic sanctions should be especially successful in improving the level of democracy in the targeted country. Table 3 below shows the democratic development among countries subjected to sanctions with varying goals.

Table 3: Mean Yearly Change in Democracy Scores according to Different Sanction Goals

Sanction Goal	Change – Combined Freedom House and Polity Score (0–10)	Change – Combined Inverted Freedom House Score (0–10)	Change – Combined Polity IV Score (0–10)	Country Years
Democratization	.198	.156	.241	261
Support for Human Rights	.152	.141	.138	195
Fighting of Narcotics	0	0	0	4
Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction	.023	.019	.006	85
Peace	.160	.166	.210	161
Fighting of Terrorism	.034	.029	.061	115
Enforcement of Sanctions against Other Country	.018	.034	0	24
Protest against (Mis)Treatment of Diplomats	0	0	0	2
No Sanction	.098	.072	.113	1472

Note: Sanctions are lagged one year.

Source: Authors' compilation.

Looking at the descriptive data, one can identify four relatively frequent goals in the sanctions imposed on authoritarian regimes. Democratization is the most common goal, but sanctions have also frequently been used to support human rights, to promote peace and to fight terrorism. The table above illustrates democratic development using three different measures: the combined (reversed) Freedom House and Polity IV score, the combined (reversed) Freedom House score, and the Polity IV score. This alternative use of indices ensures that the choice of index is not decisive for the results. The table suggests that there might be clear differences in outcome according to the different goals. The mean yearly change in the

combined Freedom House and Polity score is 0.098 for countries that have not been subjected to sanctions. Only three categories of sanctions, those related to democracy, to peace and to human rights, exhibit democratic outcomes that are more positive than when no sanctions are put in place.

According to the theory of concession costs laid out earlier, the positive outcomes of democratic sanctions and peace sanctions are to be expected given that the concession cost in such cases would be high. The strong democratic development in cases of human rights sanctions is more surprising. However, their positive outcome might be a result of the fact that these sanctions often coexist with democratic sanctions. It is therefore interesting to see how this category performs in the control for democratic sanctions in the multivariate analysis. Cases where the five remaining categories of sanctions – sanctions to fight narcotics, sanctions to stop the development of weapons of mass destruction, sanctions to fight terrorism, sanctions to get countries to enforce sanctions against a third party, and sanctions against mistreatment of diplomats – were imposed all show less democratic development than cases where no sanctions were imposed. Admittedly, the number of cases for some of these categories is rather small; we therefore hereafter combine the narcotics, sanction enforcement and diplomat expulsion sanctions into a residual “other” category.

Since one sanction episode might be motivated by several goals and one country might be subject to sanctions imposed by multiple actors (sometimes with varying goals), we have to move away from bivariate analysis in order to control for potential confounding variables and overlapping sanction goals. The main analyses are displayed in Table 4. Again, the dependent variable is the change in the combined Freedom House and Polity index. Hence, the dependent variable represents $D_{i,t} - D_{i,t-1}$, where D represents the level of democracy for country i and time t . All models use panel-corrected standard errors and a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to account for serial correlation (Beck and Katz 1995). All independent variables, including sanctions, are lagged one year. Lagging the independent variables has important consequences for the results. Sanctions are often implemented as a result of drastic democratic decline, such as unfair elections or coup d'états. Therefore, the democratic development in the first year of a sanction episode is often more a cause than a consequence of the sanction. All models feature the same controls, but they vary in how they account for sanctions. All models have been checked for multicollinearity.

Model 1 shows the general effect of sanctions when we control for the usual independent variables. The results are remarkable given that previous research has shown a robust negative impact of sanctions on democracy (Peksen and Drury 2010). Model 1 displays a positive, but insignificant, effect of sanctions on democratic development in targeted countries. Although this is certainly not enough evidence to claim that sanctions have a positive effect on democratization, it suggests that the previously acknowledged negative effect does not exist when we look at the post-Cold War period. However, when we look specifically at democratic sanctions in Model 2, we observe much clearer positive outcomes. The variable for demo-

cratic sanctions becomes highly significant and the expected yearly change in democracy scores is 0.181 higher in authoritarian countries with democratic sanctions than in those without. The models utilize a combined Freedom House and Polity IV score to account for democratic change, but the results also remain robust if the indices are used separately to account for democratic change.

Table 4: Regression Models 1–4

Dependent Variable: Change in Level of Democracy				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
LDV	.044 (.068)	.044 (.068)	.042 (.069)	.043 (.068)
Sanctions	.055 (.046)	–	–	–
DM Sanctions	–	.181*** (.067)	–	.157* (.081)
HR Sanctions	–	–	–	.036 (.106)
PC Sanctions	–	–	–	.063 (.106)
TR Sanctions	–	–	–	-.110 (.101)
WMD Sanctions	–	–	–	.035 (.131)
OT Sanctions	–	–	–	-.108 (.102)
Nondemocratic	–	–	-.084 (.060)	–
Log Population	-.034*** (.011)	-.037*** (.011)	-.031*** (.011)	-.037 (.012)
GDP	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Trade	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.001 (.000)	-.001 (.000)
FDI	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Civil War	.068 (.059)	.086 (.058)	.075 (.060)	.086 (.057)
Constant	.467*** (.135)	.476*** (.136)	.466*** (.134)	.482 (.140)
Observations	1551	1551	1551	1551
Number of Countries	119	119	119	119
R Squared	.009	.013	.010	.014

* = Significant at the .10 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; *** = Significant at the .01 level.

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors within parentheses. All independent variables use a one-year lag. DM = democratization; HR = human rights; PC = peace; TR = terror; WMD = weapons of mass destruction; OT = other.

Source: Authors' compilation.

Further emphasizing the importance of separating democratic sanctions from other sanction categories, Model 3 introduces a variable that accounts for nondemocratic sanctions (that is, all sanction categories except democratic sanctions). Not only does the coefficient become insignificant when the democratic sanctions are excluded, it also changes direction and becomes negative. Since many of the cases are targeted with sanctions that have multiple goals, Model 4 introduces controls for all the sanction categories. The results regarding democratic sanctions remain significant. Moreover, Model 4 clearly alters the picture gained from the descriptive statistics. Although sanctions with peace goals or those aimed at improving human rights conditions are associated with a clearly positive outcome in the descriptive statistics (Table 3), they do not remain significant when we control for the democratic sanction type.

A potential problem with the results above could be that the democratic sanctions are generally more intense than sanctions imposed to obtain other goals.¹⁵ In Table 5, we therefore make the distinction between intense and nonintense sanctions and observe whether the variable remains significant when we control for these different measures.¹⁶

Models 5 and 6 show the effect of nonintense and intense sanctions. The results suggest that intense sanctions have a more positive effect than nonintense sanctions, but the effect is still not significant. Model 7 replicates Model 4, but adds a control for intense sanctions. We find no evidence in this model to suggest that the effect of democratic sanctions is due to their more intense nature. Instead, the democratic sanctions variable remains significant, with a slightly larger coefficient than in Model 4.

All in all, these analyses indicate that sanctions have not been counterproductive to the democratic development of authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War period. The generally negative impact of sanctions found in earlier research does not transfer to this later time period. Most importantly, those sanctions that are actually designed to enhance democracy in autocratic countries clearly show a positive impact in the models presented above.¹⁷

15 However, it is important to note that the literature on sanctions does not predict that intense sanctions are always more effective, and especially not when they are imposed on authoritarian regimes (Lektzian and Souva 2007).

16 To reiterate Table 2, nonintense sanctions include visa bans, asset freezes, diplomatic sanctions, military sanctions and arms embargoes. Intense sanctions include aid sanctions, commodity embargoes, financial sanctions and comprehensive trade embargoes.

17 Models 1–7 were also run using a fixed-effects regression model (see Beck and Katz, 1995 on the advantages of using panel-corrected standard errors). Changing model specifications had no substantive effect on the results. On the contrary, the positive effect of democratic sanctions was reaffirmed and the general sanction variable in Model 1 even became significantly positive with the fixed-effects specification.

Table 5: Regression Models 5–7

Dependent Variable: Change in Level of Democracy			
	(5)	(6)	(7)
LDV	.044 (.069)	.045 (.068)	.042 (.068)
DM Sanctions	–	–	.196* (.101)
HR Sanctions	–	–	.040 (.106)
PC Sanctions	–	–	.087 (.113)
TR Sanctions	–	–	-.085 (.099)
WMD Sanctions	–	–	.063 (.146)
OT Sanctions	–	–	-.075 (.115)
Nonintense sanctions	-.014 (.069)	–	–
Intense sanctions	–	.065 (.056)	-.058 (.102)
Log Population	-.0342*** (.011)	-.033*** (.011)	-.038*** (.012)
GDP	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Trade	-.001 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.001 (.000)
FDI	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Civil War	.068 (.059)	.066 (.059)	.088 (.058)
Constant	.463*** (.134)	.455*** (.138)	.492*** (.142)
Observations	1551	1551	1551
Number of Countries	119	119	119
R Squared	.009	.009	.014

* = Significant at the .10 level; ** = significant at the .05 level; *** = significant at the .01 level.

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors within parentheses. All independent variables use a one-year lag. DM = democratization; HR = human rights; PC = peace; TR = terror; WMD = weapons of mass destruction; OT = other.

Source: Authors' compilation.

4.1 Supplementary Tests on Sanctions and Regime Stability

The previous section has shown that democratic sanctions are associated with increased levels of democracy. In Section 2, we argued that the relationship between democratic sanctions

and democratization is likely to be an effect of democratic sanctions being imposed despite the high or even potentially regime-threatening costs of rejection. As a supplementary test, we have run a series of logistic regressions accounting for regime instability. Below we introduce models using irregular ruler exit and regime change as the dependent variables.

The models below are logistic regressions with conditional fixed effects. The fixed-effects specification is a strategy that can be used to account for country-specific omitted variables.¹⁸ Following Marinov (2005) we use a fixed-effects model rather than an event-history model.¹⁹ According to Beck et al. (1998), when using cross-sectional time-series data with a dichotomous dependent variable of an event measured at discrete intervals, fixed-effects logit is technically equivalent to an event-history model. The models use largely the same control variables as the main regression models. In addition, the models for leadership exit introduce a control for the number of years a leader has been in office to account for natural replacements over time.²⁰ In the models for regime change, we include a variable accounting for the number of years a country has been categorized as a specific regime type (Table 6). This variable resembles a lagged dependent variable, and serves to capture regime stability up to that particular point in time.

The models above confirm our expectations that democratic sanctions induce irregular leadership exit and regime change. Model 8 reaffirms Marinov's (2005) finding that sanctions generally increase the probability of leadership exit. As Model 9 demonstrates, the relationship is stronger for the democratic sanctions than for the nondemocratic sanctions.²¹ Looking at the models for regime change, we see no significant effect of sanctions generally (Model 10), but we find a significant effect for democratic sanctions (Model 11). These results support the argument that democratic sanctions can be a threat to the survival of authoritarian institutions.

In Guatemala (1993), for instance, the military ousted President Serrano, who had unconstitutionally dissolved parliament and the judiciary, after the US and its allies imposed sanctions on Guatemala. An interim president took over, and the country's democratic institutions were restored. In Nicaragua (1996) and Thailand (1993), sanctions also contributed to regime change. However, democratic sanctions rarely create liberal democracies instantly; rather, they lead to limited multiparty regimes. In addition, democratic sanctions have different effects on autocratic rulers and regimes. In Peru, sanctions contributed to democratization without ruler change. When President Alberto Fujimori suspended the legislature and

18 A problem with the fixed-effects model is that it excludes all clusters without variation in the dependent variable (i.e., the most stable regimes). However, a Hausman test reveals that the unique errors are correlated with the regressors, hence suggesting that a fixed-effects model is preferable to a model using random effects (Greene 2002).

19 To assess leader exit with their specification, Escribà-Folch and Wright (2010) ran multinomial logistic regressions.

20 Data is taken from the 2010 version of the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001).

21 The models also show that a longer time in office increases the likelihood of change. This might seem like a peculiar result, but is a consequence of the fixed-effects estimation and the relatively short time period. The model only includes countries with at least one change in office and estimates the results within those clusters.

introduced rule by decree in 1992, the US withheld military assistance and economic aid and blocked Peru's efforts to obtain loans from international financial institutions. In response, Fujimori agreed to hold elections and to reinstate democratic institutions. Although his presidential dominance persisted up to 2000, Peru's political system was liberalized to some extent for the remainder of his time in office (Collins 2009a: 80–81).

Table 6: Conditional Fixed-Effects Logistic Regressions of Regime Change and Leader Exit (Models 8–11)

	Ruler exit	Ruler exit	Regime change	Regime change
	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Sanction	1.057* (.545)	–	.546 (.668)	–
DM Sanction	–	1.540** (.758)	–	1.454** (.695)
Nondemocratic Sanction	–	1.065* (.595)	–	-.465 (.766)
Intense	-.735 (.566)	-1.113** (.697)	-.738 (.679)	-1.344** (.680)
Log Population	-.144 (1.033)	-.236 (1.047)	-.970 (.789)	-1.242 (.808)
GDP/Capita	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Trade	.006 (.005)	.006 (.005)	-.003 (.005)	-.004 (.006)
FDI	-.031** (.015)	-.030 (.015)	-.028* (.015)	-.028* (.015)
Civil War	.363 (.319)	.395 (.319)	.019 (.313)	.082 (.314)
Leader's Years in Office	.057**	.057***	–	–
Duration of Regime Type	–	–	-.038** (.018)	-.038* (.018)
Observations	871	871	1088	1088
Number of Countries	62	62	81	81
Log Likelihood	-261.274	-260.699	-306.113	-301.651
Pseudo R2	.0335	.0356	.0252	.0394

* = Significant at the .10 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; *** = Significant at the .01 level.

Note: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression. Entries are logistic coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged one year.

Source: Authors' compilation.

Interestingly, Table 6 also shows that foreign direct investment decreases the chances of both ruler exit (Model 8) and regime change (Model 10). However, this might be due international investors' aversion to investing in politically instable countries rather than being a causal explanation for regime durability. From the perspective of sanctions, it is interesting to see that

intense sanctions decrease the likelihood of regime change in models 9 and 11. The intensity of sanctions has not been the main focus of this paper, but these results at least partially confirm Galtung's (1967) skepticism about the naive theory of sanctions.

It is not possible to offer comparative predicted probabilities on the basis of a conditional fixed-effects model (Wooldridge 2002), but as Marinov (2005: 572) argues, extracting the marginal change in the predicted probability for individual clusters in the models is desirable.²² There is a clear difference in the predicted probabilities of both ruler change and regime-type change when democratic sanctions are imposed. Keeping all continuous variables at their means and all categorical variables at their mode, the average predicted probability for leader exit across all clusters in a given year rises from 0.169 without a democratic sanction to 0.448 when a democratic sanction is in place. The corresponding number for change in regime type is 0.254 without democratic sanctions and 0.442 when democratic sanctions have been imposed. There are several instances where regime change has been preceded by sanctions, although we would not argue that the relationship between sanctions and institutional change was causal in all these instances. Appendix 1 provides a full list of these instances. Changes in regime type rarely lead to full democracy, and sometimes countries transition from what could generally be perceived as a more democratic regime type to a less democratic one. However, most of the instances where change in regime type is preceded by democratic sanctions show signs of at least limited liberalization (such as the implementation of multiparty elections).

None of the models above have distinguished between different forms of authoritarianism. Earlier research has demonstrated the probability that different types of authoritarian regimes respond differently to sanctions (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010). This paper's analysis has shown that the type of sanction is as important as the type of authoritarian regime the sanction is directed against. Authoritarian regimes tend to democratize and become less stable when they are subjected to sanctions with democratic goals. These results hold true even when we do not distinguish between different forms of authoritarianism.

5 Conclusion

Previous research on sanctions, which mostly focused on Cold War dynamics and economic sanctions alone, demonstrated that sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. Using a new data set that covers post-Cold War

22 Following Marinov (2005: 572), we estimated the model as an ordinary logistic regression with country intercepts as dummy variables in the model. The model yielded very similar results to the conditional fixed-effects logit. Post-estimations were derived for every country using Long and Freese's (2006) *Spost* package for Stata. Admittedly, the predicted probabilities are affected by the fact that only those series with at least one positive outcome are included in the models (therefore excluding the most stable cases). However, this adheres to both the baseline predicted probabilities and the probabilities associated with sanctions.

sanctions for the period 1990–2010 and based on a number of cross-sectional time-series analyses, we have generated more optimistic results, particularly for those sanctions that explicitly aim to achieve democratization.

Our – somewhat counterintuitive – theoretical argument is that this positive outcome of democratic sanctions can be attributed to the higher concession costs faced by the target for this particular sanction type. Conceding to democratic sanctions is especially costly to authoritarian regimes, because means such as vote rigging, interfering with the media and repressing the opposition are generally necessary for them to stay in office. In consequence, autocrats cannot concede to democratic sanctions at the threat stage without jeopardizing their own political survival. Building on various scholars' insights regarding the threat of sanctions (Drury and Li 2006; Hovi et al. 2005; Lacy and Niou 2004; Morgan et al. 2009), we therefore argue that this more positive outcome for imposed democratic sanctions can be explained by the smaller selection effect associated with this specific sanction type.

Based on the results presented, future research could address the following two issues, thereby further complementing the major advances which sanctions research has made in recent years. First, the factors accounting for the selection of authoritarian sanction targets warrant further detailed analysis. As the paper has argued, the end of the Cold War has eliminated the confrontation between two camps as the main driver of threatened and imposed sanctions. An investigation of the factors influencing target selection would provide empirical information on selection criteria and at the same time inform the selection bias discussion in general (Blake and Klemm 2006; Nooruddin and Payton 2010; Nooruddin 2002). Second, democratic sanctions' effects could be further analyzed by disaggregating different authoritarian regime types (see for comparison Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Escribà-Folch 2012) – namely, military, one-party and electoral authoritarian regimes. The costs of conceding to democratic sanctions should vary according to the different political dynamics of each regime type. Such an investigation could be carried out by incorporating further country-specific features, such as economic strength and power resources such as ideology, into the analysis of the target countries.

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Appendix 1: Change in Regime Type

Country	Former Regime Type	New Regime Type	Country	Former Regime Type	New Regime Type
Burundi (2001)	Military	Transitional	Haiti (2006)	Occupation	Limited Multiparty
Burundi (2004)	Other	Transitional	Honduras (2010)	Transitional	Limited Multiparty
Burundi (2005)	Limited Multiparty	Other	Kenya (1992)	One-party	Limited Multiparty
Central African Republic (2005)	Military	Military Multiparty	Malawi (1994)	One-party	Democracy
Cote d'Ivoire	Military	Limited Multiparty	Mauritania (2009)	Military	Military Multiparty
DR Congo (1997)	Rebel Regime	Military One-party	Myanmar (2010)	Military	Military Multiparty
DR Congo (2004)	Military	Rebel Regime	Nicaragua (1996)	Limited Multiparty	Democracy
DR Congo (2006)	Military	Military Multiparty	Niger 2010	Transitional	Limited Multiparty
Equatorial Guinea	One-party	Limited Multiparty	Nigeria (1999)	Military	Limited Multiparty
Gambia (1997)	Military	Limited Multiparty	Pakistan (2002)	Military	Military Multiparty
Guinea (2010)	Military	Limited Multiparty	Peru (2001)	Limited Multiparty	Democracy
Guinea-Bissau (2004)	Military	Limited Multiparty	Thailand (1992)	Military	Democracy
Haiti (1994)	Military	Limited Multiparty	Thailand (1993)	Democracy	Military
Haiti (2004)	Limited Multiparty	Occupation	Togo (1994)	Transitional	Military Multiparty

Note: The table includes all instances coded as change in regime type by Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman (2012) where the change was preceded by a democratic sanction (at t-1).

Source: Authors' compilation.

Appendix 2: Sanction Episodes, 1990–2010

Democratic Sanctions			Nondemocratic Sanctions		
Target	Sender	Time Frame	Target	Sender	Time Frame
Algeria	EU	1992–1994	Afghanistan	UN	1999–2002
Belarus	EU	2000–ongoing	Azerbaijan	US	1992–2002
Belarus	US	2004–ongoing	Belarus	EU	1998–1999
Cameroon	US	1992–1998	Bosnia and Herzegovina	EU	1992–2006
CAR	EU	2003–2005	Bosnia and Herzegovina	UN	1992–1996
CAR	US	2003–2005	Colombia	US	1996–1998
China	US	1989–ongoing	Croatia	EU	1992–2000
China	EU	1989–ongoing	Croatia	UN	1992–1996
Comoros	EU	1999–2000	DRC	EU	1997–2008
Côte d'Ivoire	US	1999–2002	DRC	UN	2003–2008
Côte d'Ivoire	EU	2000–2002	Eritrea	UN	2000–2001
Côte d'Ivoire	UN	2004–ongoing	Eritrea	US	2006–ongoing
Cuba	US	1960–ongoing	Eritrea	UN	2009–ongoing
Cuba	EU	2003–2005	Ethiopia	UN	2000–2001
DRC	US	1990–1997	FRY	UN	1991–1995
DRC	EU	1992–1997	FRY	EU	1991–1997
Equatorial Guinea	EU	1992–ongoing	FRY	US	1995–1999
Fiji	EU	2001–2003	FRY	EU	1998–2001
Fiji	EU	2006–ongoing	FRY	UN	1998–2001
Fiji	US	2006–ongoing	FRY	US	1998–2001
FRY	US	1991–1995	Haiti	US	1991–2006
FRY	US	1999–2003	Indonesia	US	1992–2005
Gambia	US	1994–1998	Indonesia	EU	1998–1999
Gambia	EU	1994–2002	Iran	US	1984–ongoing
Guatemala	EU	1993–1993	Iran	UN	2006–ongoing
Guatemala	US	1993–1993	Iraq	US	1982–2003
Guinea	EU	2002–2006	Iraq	UN	1990–1991
Guinea	EU	2009–ongoing	Iraq	UN	1991–2003
Guinea	US	2009–2010	Jordan	US	1990–1997
Guinea-Bissau	US	2003–2004	Liberia	UN	1992–2001
Haiti	US	1991–1994	Liberia	EU	2001–2001
Haiti	UN	1993–1994	Liberia	UN	2001–2003
Haiti	EU	2001–2005	Libya	US	1978–2004

Democratic Sanctions			Nondemocratic Sanctions		
Target	Sender	Time Frame	Target	Sender	Time Frame
Haiti	US	2002–2005	Libya	EU	1986–2004
Honduras	EU	2009–2010	Libya	UN	1992–2003
Honduras	US	2009–2010	Macedonia	EU	1991–2000
Kenya	US	1990–1993	Macedonia	UN	1991–1996
Madagascar	EU	2009–2011	North Korea	US	1993–ongoing
Madagascar	US	2010–ongoing	North Korea	UN	2006–ongoing
Malawi	EU	1992–1994	Peru	US	1995–1998
Malawi	US	1992–1994	Rwanda	EU	1994–1995
Mauritania	US	2008–2009	Rwanda	UN	1994–1995
Mauritania	EU	2008–2009	Somalia	US	1989–ongoing
Myanmar	US	1988–ongoing	Sri Lanka	US	2008–ongoing
Myanmar	EU	1996–ongoing	Sudan	US	1993–ongoing
Nicaragua	US	1992–1995	Sudan	EU	1994–ongoing
Niger	EU	1996–1999	Sudan	UN	1996–ongoing
Niger	US	1996–2000	Sudan	UN	2005–ongoing
Niger	US	2009–2011	Syria	US	1986–2003
Nigeria	US	1993–1998	Syria	EU	1987–1994
Nigeria	EU	1993–1999	Syria	US	2004–ongoing
North Korea	US	1950–ongoing	Uzbekistan	EU	2005–2009
Pakistan	US	1999–2001	Venezuela	US	2006–ongoing
Peru	US	1991–1995	Vietnam	US	1975–1994
Peru	EU	2000–2001	Yemen	US	1990–1997
Russia	US	1991–1991			
Russia	EU	1991–1991			
Thailand	US	1991–1992			
Togo	EU	1992–1995			
Togo	EU	1998–2004			
Turkey	EU	1995–1995			
Uzbekistan	US	2005–ongoing			
Zambia	EU	1996–1999			
Zimbabwe	EU	2002–ongoing			
Zimbabwe	US	2002–ongoing			

Source: Authors' compilation.

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